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Over the past four decades, real estate investment trusts or REITs as they are 
commonly called have become a significant asset class.  In fact, REITs have become the 
third largest asset class available to investors, behind bonds and stocks (Imperiale, 2002). 
The sustained growth of the public REIT market has been nothing short of phenomenal.  
For example, the past four decades have seen the industry expand from 34 publicly traded 
REITs with a market capitalization of $1.4 billion in 1971, to 197, with a market 
capitalization in excess of $330 billion at the end of 2005 (National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts, Inc., 2006).  During this period of exponential growth, the 
REIT investment vehicle of choice has been equity REITs which increased both in terms 
of number- from 12 in 1971 to 152 at the end 2005, and capitalization, from $332 million 
in 1971 to $331 billion at the end of 2005.  Table 1 presents a summary of the  REIT 
industry market capitalization between 1972 and 2005.   
Real estate investment trusts are companies that are publicly traded on the major 
US stock exchanges, namely the New York Stock Exchange, American or NASDAQ.  
From the perspective of investors, REIT stocks represent a form of securitized real estate 










HISTORICAL REIT INDUSTRY MARKET CAPITALIZATION: 1971-2005 
  Composite Equity Mortgage 
Hybrid 
End of # of Market Average # of Market 











34 1,494.30 43.95 12 332 12 570.8 10 591.6 
1972 
46 1,880.90 40.89 17 377.3 18 774.7 11 728.9 
1973 53 1,393.50 26.29 20 336 22 517.3 11 540.2 
1974 
53 712.4 13.44 19 241.9 22 238.8 12 231.7 
1975 
46 899.7 19.56 12 275.7 22 312 12 312 
1976 
62 1,308.00 21.10 27 409.6 22 415.6 13 482.8 
1977 
69 1,528.10 22.15 32 538.1 19 398.3 18 591.6 
1978 
71 1,412.40 19.89 33 575.7 19 340.3 19 496.4 
1979 
71 1,754.00 24.70 32 743.6 19 377.1 20 633.3 
1980 
75 2,298.60 30.65 35 942.2 21 509.5 19 846.8 
1981 
76 2,438.90 32.09 36 977.5 21 541.3 19 920.1 
1982 
66 3,298.60 49.98 30 1,071.40 20 1,133.40 16 1,093.80 
1983 
59 4,257.20 72.16 26 1,468.60 19 1,460.00 14 1,328.70 
1984 
59 5,085.30 86.19 25 1,794.50 20 1,801.30 14 1,489.40 
1985 
82 7,674.00 93.59 37 3,270.30 32 3,162.40 13 1,241.20 
1986 
96 9,923.60 103.37 45 4,336.10 35 3,625.80 16 1,961.70 
1987 
110 9,702.40 88.20 53 4,758.50 38 3,161.40 19 1,782.40 
1988 
117 11,435.20 97.74 56 6,141.70 40 3,620.80 21 1,672.60 
1989 
120 11,662.20 97.19 56 6,769.60 43 3,536.30 21 1,356.30 
1990 
119 8,737.10 73.42 58 5,551.60 43 2,549.20 18 636.3 
1991 
138 12,968.20 93.97 86 8,785.50 28 2,586.30 24 1,596.40 
1992 
142 15,912.00 112.06 89 11,171.10 30 2,772.80 23 1,968.10 
1993 
189 32,158.70 170.15 135 26,081.90 32 3,398.50 22 2,678.20 
1994 
226 44,306.00 196.04 175 38,812.00 29 2,502.70 22 2,991.30 
1995 
219 57,541.30 262.75 178 49,913.00 24 3,395.40 17 4,232.90 
1996 
199 88,776.30 446.11 166 78,302.00 20 4,778.60 13 5,695.80 
1997 
211 140,533.80 666.04 176 127,825.30 26 7,370.30 9 5,338.20 
1998 
210 138,301.40 658.58 173 126,904.50 28 6,480.70 9 4,916.20 
1999 
203 124,261.90 612.13 167 118,232.70 26 4,441.70 10 1,587.50 
2000 
189 138,715.40 733.94 158 134,431.00 22 1,632.00 9 2,652.40 
2001 
182 154,898.60 851.09 151 147,092.10 22 3,990.50 9 3,816.00 
2002 
176 161,937.30 920.10 149 151,271.50 20 7,146.40 7 3,519.40 
2003 
171 224,211.90 1311.18 144 204,800.40 20 14,186.51 7 5,225.00 
2004 
193 307,894.73 1595.31 153 275,291.04 33 25,964.32 7 6,639.37 
2005 
197 330,691.31 1678.64 152 301,490.98 37 23,393.73 8 5,806.61 









 Essentially, today’s REITs are pools of properties and /or mortgages that are 
traded on one of the stock exchange markets.   To maintain their status as real estate 
investment trusts, these corporations are required by law to meet specific criteria 
established by the US tax code.  One such criterion stipulates that, in return for favorable 
tax treatment, REITs must distribute ninety percent of their taxable income to 
shareholders.  While this requirement might be attractive to some investors, especially 
those who require immediate return on their investments, this stipulation has the potential 
of hindering the long term growth of the REIT since this requirement effectively limits 
the ability of the company to use retained earnings for future property acquisition and 
development.  
From an ownership and management perspective, REITs are companies that are 
designed to own and manage income producing real estate such as hotels, apartment 
complexes, shopping malls, golf courses, office buildings, self storage centers, 
multifamily residential, manufactured housing, industrial properties and commercial net 
lease.   Essentially, purchasers of real estate investment trusts shares acquire assets that 
are either real property or mortgages.  Table 2 presents a summary of current REITs by 
property and sub-sector types as well as their respective market capitalization.   
REITs may also be described as specialized forms of investment companies that 
share characteristics similar to those of mutual funds.  Like mutual funds, several 
investors can pool their assets to own participation in a number of real estate investments.  
REITs therefore operate like “mutual funds for real estate”.  This feature is especially 










REITS BY PROPERTY TYPE AND PERCENT OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
Investment Sector Type of REIT  Number of Companies Equity Market 
Capitalization ($ 
millions) 
EQUITY Retail 33 85,646.7 
    Shopping Centers 18 38,114.1 
    Regional Malls 9 41,620.0 
    Free Standing 6 5,912.6 
 Industrial/Office 34 88,271.1 
   Office 23 58,909.0 
   Industrial 6 19,442.1 
   Mixed 5 9,920.0 
 Residential  55,495.0 
   Apartments 19 53,557.8 
   Manufactured Homes 4 1,937.2 
 Diversified 13 22,857.2 
 Lodging/Resorts 17 23,637.5 
 Self Storage 5 14,487.3 
 Health Care 12 15,207.2 
 Specialty 9 17,391.6 
MORTGAGE Mortgage REITs 37 25,743.8 
   Home Financing 26 18,413.7 
   Commercial Financing 11 7,330.0 
HYBRID Hybrid REITs 8 6,320.5 
    
REIT Industry Total  191 355,058.0 
Source: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, www.nareit.com (May, 2006) 
 
group from actively participating in the real estate market since most ordinary investors 
simply do not have the resources to procure these properties.  REITs however are 
dissimilar to stocks or bonds in that unlike stocks or bonds which are bought, kept or 
traded on a constant basis, REITs are operating companies which offer their stocks for 
sale.  It should be noted however that although REITS are essentially different from 
common stocks, their returns are usually determined by the performance of the 









often extend beyond real estate ownership and often include actively managing the real 
estate.  This active and participatory management includes securing tenants, collecting 
rent, paying bills and handling the overall day to day functions associated with running, 
owning and operating the real estate.  In this regard, REITs differ from mutual funds in 
that mutual funds do not manage the companies they invest in.  
These REIT characteristics therefore make it possible of investors to participate in 
a diverse portfolio of investments which they could never achieve otherwise.  Given the 
tremendous potential and benefits that REITs offer to both investors as well as owners, it 
is therefore no surprise that over the past decade, a significant trend within the real estate 
sector has been the transformation of private property ownership to REITs that are 
publicly traded (Brady & Conlin, 2004).       
 The performance of real estate investment trusts can be examined from several 
perspectives.  First, since the majority of real estate investment trusts are publicly traded 
companies (Brueggerman & Fisher, 2005), their performance as business entities has 
been  judged based on the performance of their stocks on the public stock exchanges.  In 
this regard, research pertaining to the performance of REITs has compared such 
performance against relevant market (market portfolios) benchmarks such as the S&P 
500, NYSE, and the NASDAQ composite.  Such research has yielded mixed results. In 
fact, empirical results relating to REIT performance over the past four decades have been 
at best mixed.  In addition, existing studies on the performance of REITs lack consensus, 
especially as it pertains to the performance of REITs compared to relevant benchmarks.   









of four conclusions.  Such research findings have indicated that when compared to 
relevant industry benchmarks on a risk adjusted basis, REITs have either exceeded the 
market (Kuble, Walther, & Wurtzebach, 1986), underperformed the market,(Wang, 
Erickson, Gau, & Chan, 1997;Goebel & Kim, 1989), performed slightly better or about 
the same (Glascock & Hughes, 1995;Smith, 1980; Smith & Schulman, 1976), or 
performed slightly worse than, or no better than the market portfolio (Sanders, 1998;Han 
& Liang, 1995;Howe & Shilling, 1990).  On a nominal return basis, when compared to 
relevant industry benchmarks, the trend remains the same.  REITs have either 
underperformed the market (Chen & Peiser, 1999; Glascock & Hughes, 1995), displayed 
performance that was similar to the market (Wang et al., 1997), or performed about as 
well as, or no better than the market (Smith & Schulman, 1976). 
An analysis of the findings from previous studies on the long-term performance of 
REITs also suggests that performance appears to be a function of the time period during 
which these studies were conducted.  Research conducted during the early years of REIT 
development and growth (during the 1960s and throughout the 1980s) appears to be in 
general consensus that the performance of REITs as indicated by their returns appear to 
be similar to the general stock market.  For example, Smith & Schulman, (1976) 
compared the performance of equity REITs against common stocks during the period 
January 1963 to December 1974, and found that over the sample period, equity REITs 
performed the same, or similar to, but not better than common stocks, on both a risk 
adjusted basis and nominal basis.  The exception was 1974, when the underperformance 









reported by Smith, (1980) who compared the performance of equity REITs against 
common stocks between 1965 and 1977 and also found that equity REITs performed the 
same as common stocks on a risk adjusted basis.   
Conversely, recent studies conducted to ascertain the performance of REITs 
compared to other stocks tend to contradict the findings of the earlier studies.  Later 
studies tend to suggest that compared to other stocks, REIT stock performance appears to 
be less impressive.  Instead, such studies indicate that REIT stocks either underperform 
the market or at best, performed similar to the market on a risk adjusted basis.  Such 
findings for example were reported by Sanders, (1998) who examined the historical 
performance of REIT returns on a risk adjusted basis as measured by the NAREIT index, 
against market benchmarks such as the S&P 500 index and the Wilshire index.  During 
the of 1978 to 1996, in terms of their risk-adjusted excess returns, equity REITs were 
found to perform no better than the stock market indices, Sanders (1998).   
Evidence from the literature also suggests that REITs perform differently over 
various time periods, when compared to the stock market.  For example, early studies on 
long run performance of REITs, conducted between the 1960’s through the 1980’s 
suggest that REIT returns are similar to or about the same as those of the stock market 
(Smith & Schulman, 1976; Smith, 1980).  More recent studies however do not support 
such findings, and instead portray REIT performance as less impressive than previously 
indicated.  In fact, more recent studies have either reported that REIT stocks either under-
perform the market (on a risk-adjusted basis) or performed no better than the market 









Martin & Cook, 1991; Glascock & Hughes, 1995; Wang, Erickson, Gau, & Chan, 1995; 
Wang et al., 1997; Chen & Peiser, 1999).   
Studies conducted to evaluate the performance of REITs during sub-periods have 
also yield mixed results when compared to the overall market.  For example, Sanders 
(1998), in his study of the historical performance of REITs found that during the period 
January 1978 to December 1986, equity REIT stocks outperformed key stock market 
indices.  However, the study also found that during the January 1987 to October 1990 
period, risk adjusted equity REIT returns were found to perform below the stock market.  
The study also found that during a more recent period, from November 1990 through 
June 1996, REITs outperformed the S&P 500 index. Interestingly however, REITs did 
not perform better than the Wiltshire index.  One plausible explanation for this finding is 
the fact that unlike the S&P 500, the Wiltshire index contains the stocks of small 
companies, and generally, small stocks tend to outperform large stocks (Chan et al., 
2003).  Similar performance results were reported by Han & Liang (1995), who 
examined the issues of whether REITs performed differently from common stocks, 
whether REIT performance varies significantly over time, and whether REIT 
performance is sensitive to the time period and choice of performance benchmarks.  Han 
& Liang (1995) found that REITs performed no better or somewhat more poorly than a 
broad stock market index over the period 1970-1993.  However, REIT performance was 
found to be better in some sub-periods and worse in others.  Large REIT performance 
was also found to be more stable than small REITs.  One plausible explanation for this 









smaller REITs, especially in terms of number of properties owned.   
Still, others argue that although quantitative analysis plays a significant role in the 
evaluation of REIT performance, the qualitative aspects of real estate such as property 
development should not be overlooked as these aspects have a direct effect on a REIT’s 
performance.  Brounen, Eichholtz, & Kanters (2000), argue that investors often attest that 
property development activities such as renovations will also increase the performance of 
REITs.  This notion however could be fallacious since Brounen, Eicholtz, & Kanters, 
(2000) found that although developing REITs yield higher returns than REITs that do not 
develop, when risk is taken into account, there is no synergy or relationship between 
property development and REIT investment returns.  In terms of lodging REITs, Gordon 
& McCarthy, (1998) in a study on lodging REITs argued that the actual performance of 
lodging REITs on the stock market in terms of actual returns may not necessarily be 
connected to, or a reflection of the performance of the physical assets themselves.  
Instead, they argued that there is a disconnect between the performance of the real 
property and the performance of the investment as measured by returns.  Consequently, 
they argued that REITs performance as measured by returns are more a function not of 
the performance of the real property, but instead is more reliant on the management 
expertise of investment mangers.   
Given the contentious and often conflicting findings regarding REIT performance, 
it is important that the performance of REITs is examined from several perspectives. This 
is especially important since the debate over REIT performance will remain and continue 









REITs since their emergence in the 1960’s as viable investment vehicles, little research 
has been conducted to ascertain the performance of one key and growing sub-sector of 
the equity REIT segment, hotel or lodging REITs.   
As investment vehicles, it is crucial that the performance of lodging REITs is 
examined given the volatility and cyclical nature of the lodging industry.  The importance 
of   examining hotel real estate investments is highlighted by DeRoos, (1997), who 
pointed to the growing importance of hotel capital markets.  This point was accentuated 
by Kim et al., (2002) who suggested that research that focuses on the performance of 
hotel real estate investment trust will lead to a better understanding of the performance of 
lodging assets as investment vehicles, which will ultimately provide information that can 
be used by prudent investors.   
Thus, the primary goal of this research is to ascertain the performance of lodging 
REITs and in the process shed some light on this segment’s performance, compared to 
relevant market benchmarks and other equity REITs.  This research will therefore fill a 
gap in the existing literature, and add to our knowledge of lodging REIT performance. 
 
STRUCTURE AND PAPER ORGANIZATION 
 This research is developed through five chapters.  Chapter one focuses on the   
research problem and its setting and will include the introduction, research questions, 
problem statements, definition of terms and abbreviations, assumptions, research scope 
and importance of the study.  Chapter two presented a review of related literature while 









comprised a detail explanation of the research findings while chapter five focused on 
interpretation of the results and offered recommendations for further study.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The purpose of this research is to examine the long term (period exceeding ten 
years) performance United States lodging REITs between the period January 1993 and 
December 2005.  Performance is measured by how well lodging REITs performed during 
the period compared to other equity REITs and relevant benchmarks.  The study 
attempted to   address the following three questions: 1) Do lodging REITs over perform 
or under-perform relevant market benchmarks? 2) Do lodging REITs over-perform or 
under-perform other equity REITS? 3) Is the performance of lodging REITs persistent? 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Despite the fact that several studies have examined the long term performance of 
REITs as a whole, to date little research has been conducted in the area of examining the 
performance of a key segment of the equity real estate market, lodging or hotel REITs.  It 
is essential that such studies are conducted since this segment of the REIT industry 
represents an ever growing and significant asset class.  For example, at the end of 2005, 
there were 19 lodging REITs in the United States, with assets exceeding $330 billion.   
It is also especially important to study and understand the performance of lodging 
REITs since, unlike other types of REITs, at least 75% of their assets are invested in 
either the real property or in the property’s mortgage (Kim et al., 2002).  This study will 









vehicles.  This study is also important since it will provide information that can assist 
investors in making investment as well as diversification strategy decisions.   
This study is therefore designed to determine whether or not lodging REITs 
performed better than relevant benchmarks or if they performed worse than such 
benchmarks.  The study also addressed the issue of whether lodging REITs performed 
better than other equity REITs of if they performed worse.  Finally, lodging REITs 
performance persistence was examined in this study.  
DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
For the purpose of this study, the following terms are defined as follows:   
 
REIT: Acronym for real estate investment trust, which is a company that owns, and/or in 
most cases operates income producing real estate.  To be classified as a real estate 
investment trust company, a business entity must distribute at least 90% of its taxable 
income to shareholders annually in the form of dividends.   
Mortgage REITs: These are real estate investment trust companies that lend money 
directly to real estate owners and their operators, or indirectly through acquisition of 
loans or mortgage-backed securities. 
Hybrid REITs: These are real estate investment trust companies that invest in properties 
and make loans to owners and operators.   
Benchmarks: Relevant established market portfolios against which to measure 
performance.   









times the current market price of the stock.   
Exchange-traded:  This means that the shares are traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or over the counter on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ), system.   
Risk: The probability of a loss or deviation from expected results.  Risk is also the chance 
that an investment's actual return will be different than expected.  
Systematic Risk: The risk inherent to the entire market or entire market segment. 
Also known as "un-diversifiable risk" or "market risk", this type of risk is caused by 
market events and therefore results from forces outside the firm’s control and is not 
unique to a given security, it cannot be controlled through diversification.   
Unsystematic Risk:  This is the risk that affects a single asset or a small group of assets. 
Since this type of risk is unique to individual companies or assets they are also termed 
unique or asset specific risks.  This type of risk can be controlled through portfolio 
diversification.   
Security Market Line:  The general relationship that shows the risk-return trade-off for an 
individual security.  Hence, it is the positively sloped straight line displaying the 
relationship between expected return and beta.   
Beta:  This is a relative measure of the non-diversifiable risk of an individual asset when 
it is added to a diversified portfolio.  Hence, it is a measure of the systematic or market 
risk of a firm’s common stock and therefore measures the sensitivity of an asset’s return 
to the overall change in return on the market portfolio.  Hence, Beta is a measure of the 









whole.   
Market Risk Premium: This is the slope of the security market line, the difference 
between the expected return on a market portfolio and the risk free rate.  It is also defined 
as the difference between the expected return on the market portfolio and the risk-free 
rate.   
Performance Persistence:  Refers to the performance consistency of funds or investments 
from one period to another.  For example, a REIT that performs well (or badly) in one 
period is considered to be persistent if it performs the same in subsequent periods.   
ASSUMPTIONS 
 This study utilized data obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database.  Specifically, it utilized the monthly stock returns for lodging REITs 
during the period January 1993 to December 2005.  It is assumed that the data accurately 
reflects lodging REIT performance during the examination period.   
RESEARCH SCOPE 
For the purpose of this study, only US lodging REIT data available from the 
CRSP data base were examined.   Further, only data available from the CRSP database 
during the period January 01, 1993 to December 31, 2005 are examined.   
 
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this research is to examine the performance of lodging real estate 









that will add to our knowledge of how lodging REITs perform as investment vehicles.  
This knowledge will lead to a better understanding as well as help real estate investors 
understand the nature of their REIT investment.  Further, knowledge of the performance 
of lodging REITs will also assist asset managers and hospitality executives in effectively 
managing their lodging real estate portfolios, with the ultimate goal of maximizing 
shareholders wealth.   
Despite the fact that several studies have examined the long term performance of 
REITs as a whole, to date little research has been conducted in the area of examining the 
performance of a key segment of the equity real estate market, lodging REITs.  It is also 
especially important to study and understand the performance of lodging REITs since 
unlike other types of REITs, at least 75% of lodging REIT assets are invested in either 
the real property or in the property’s mortgage (Kim et al., 2002).  This research will 
therefore add to our understanding of the behavior of lodging REITs as investment 
vehicles.  Further, it is important to examine the performance of REIT stocks since unlike 
the price of real property, REIT prices changes on a continuous basis.  The information 
that this research provides is important since it offers insights that will assist investors in 
making investment as well as diversification strategy decisions.   
Further, given the fact that the hospitality industry is prone to, and is affected by 
events in the macro economic environment as well as single and unpredicted events, it is 
important that this study is undertaken so as to provide information especially for 
investors to ascertain whether or not they should invest in lodging REITs.   









viable investment vehicles is best highlighted by their market capitalization.  Table 1 
highlighted the rapid growth of REITs in terms of total market capitalization.  As the 
table shows, at the end of 1971, the total equity market capitalization of REITs was $1.4 
billion.  However, by the end of 2005, the total market capitalization of all exchange 
traded REITs had surpassed $330 billion.   The number of initial public offerings 
(IPO’s) is also an indication of the growth and importance of publicly traded companies.  
Between the years 1982 and 1991, there were a total of 116 IPOs of REIT stocks which 
raised $9.4 billion in equity capital.  During the same period, 133 secondary equity 
offerings raised $5.2 billion in capital for publicly traded REITs, while secondary debt 
offerings raised a total of $9.5 billion. The year 1991 was significant in terms of REIT 
growth as it marked a surge in the real estate investment market.  Between the years 
1993-1994 a total of 95 initial public offerings of REITs were made.  However, since 
1994, it appears as though the REIT market has cooled or matured as there were only 109 
initial public offerings between the years 1995 to 2005 (IPO Vital Signs, 2005; National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts [NAREIT], 2006).   
However, in terms of importance, perhaps the most significant indication and 
validation that REITs have arrived as viable mainstream asset class/investment vehicles 
is the fact that as of June, 2006, the Standard & Poor 500 which includes the leading 
companies in corporate America, included eleven REITs (National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trust [NAREIT], 2006).  
 Given the exponential growth of REITs as indicated by the number and growth of 









trusts will continue to grow.  Accordingly, as the number of REITs and their prominence 
as viable investment vehicles continue to grow, it becomes acutely important for both 
investors and managers of real estate investment trusts to develop a better understanding 
of how they perform as investment vehicles.  This is especially important because of the 
fact that although REIT stocks are traded like other stocks on the regular, public markets, 
they have been found to have unique characteristics which cause them to act differently 
from other general stocks on variables such as dividend policies, return prediction, capital 
structure, as well as initial and seasoned public offerings (Chan et al., 2005).  It therefore 
is paramount that studies such as this one is undertaken to shed light on the performance 
of lodging REITs.   
Further, given the rapid expansion and growth in the number of REITs combined 
with the growth in institutional interests  in them as viable investment vehicle combined 
with the fact that research has shown that they perform differently from other stocks, it  is 
important that studies are conducted to document their performance as investment 











REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter presents a review of literature relating to real estate investment trusts 
and their performance.  To provide an in-dept understanding of the REIT industry, this 
chapter will first outline the history and evolution of real estate investment trusts as 
viable investment vehicles.  The chapter then focuses on the types of REITs and their 
legal structure as well as REIT termination status and penalties.  The appeal of REITs as 
viable investment vehicles is also addressed.  Following this, the concept of lodging 
REITs, the primary focus of this research is discussed.  Literature related to the 
performance of REITs is also discussed.  Finally, the chapter focuses on measuring and 
benchmarking performance and lodging REIT performance.  These topics are essential as 
they establish the background and foundation for this research.    
 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION 
 
Real Estate Investment Trusts: The early Years 
The evolution and history of the REIT industry in the United States can be best 









industry has enjoyed successes as well as failures, punctuated by notable booms 
and busts.  Accordingly, as investment vehicles, the performance of REITs has also 
fluctuated dramatically between periods of pronounced booms and distinct busts.  These 
distinct periods are marked by the distinct declines brought on by bankruptcies in the 
1970s, inflation induced decline in the 1980s, followed by rapid expansion in the latter 
part of the 1980’s brought on through the direct action of government intervention, 
followed by decline in the early 1990s and eventual growth in the latter part of the 1990s 
which continued through the 2000s. 
The concept of real estate investment trusts in the United States dates back to the 
early 1880s.  Although most literature document the origin of REITs to the passage of the 
Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960, their actual genesis can be traced back to the 
early 1900s when the Massachusetts Trust Company was formed by a group of New 
England entrepreneurs who wanted to profit from the burgeoning real estate industry.  At 
the time, under Massachusetts law, corporations could only own real estate if the real 
estate was a key component of the business (Chan et al., 2003).  Accordingly, the only 
way for the Massachusetts Trust Company to take advantage of the real estate market 
while at the same time adhering to the law was to develop the Massachusetts Trust 
Company, a REIT like structure which legally allowed the corporation to invest in real 
estate, while at the same time enjoy benefits usually reserved for corporations such as the 
transferability of ownership shares, centralized management and limited liability (Chan et 
al., 2003).   









trusts were not available to the general public as investment vehicles and were effectively 
established as business trusts.  Instead, they were initially available only to the affluent 
segment of New England society (Maloney, 1998; Chan et al., 2003).  However, over 
time they became available to the general investing public (Valachi, 1977).   
This early trust allowed investors to pool their resources, which provided them 
with the ability to acquire larger and diverse holdings than would be available to 
individuals.  The trust was also attractive as an investment vehicle since it was exempted 
from federal taxation which meant that individual investors could receive income derived 
from rent that were tax free at the individual level.  However, this tax exemption was on 
the condition that the income derived from these trusts was distributed to beneficiaries.  
These trusts were treated like partnerships and subchapter S corporations and like other 
pass through entities.  Hence, these trusts were taxed only at the shareholder level.  
In time, the Massachusetts Trust Company grew to include the general public and 
expanded from the New England area to Chicago, Omaha and Denver.  However, the 
Great Depression of the 1930s stagnated the growth of real estate investment and 
development, hence hampering further expansion of the Massachusetts Trust Company.  
The early growth of real estate investment trusts was further stunted when the United 
States Supreme Court ruled in 1935 that all passive investment vehicles that were 
centrally organized and managed like corporations should be taxed as corporations.  This 
ruling included REITs and as a result, such trusts were no longer exempted from 
corporate taxation and their entity level taxation ceased to exist.  Consequently, they 









estate investment trusts were not organized to the point where they could effectively 
lobby or petition Congress and press for a repeal of the legislation.  However, by the 
1950’s, advocates of the real estate investment trust started to lobby the United States 
Congress to pass legislation that would grant favorable tax treatment to real estate 
investment trust companies.   
Over the next decade, the concept of real estate investment trusts remained 
dormant until 1960 when the United States Congress passed the Real Estate Investment 
Act which effectively ushered in the modern day REIT concept.  This Act which became 
effective in 1961 was prompted by the fact that following World War II, there was a need 
for large amounts of real estate equity and mortgage funds, which in turn spurred 
renewed interest in real estate investment trusts.  As a result, a campaign was launched to 
obtain special tax considerations for REITs that were comparable or similar to those 
received by mutual funds.  As a consequence of this lobbying, the United States tax code 
was amended to allow real estate trusts to be treated like closed-end mutual funds, which 
meant that real estate companies could become companies whose assets could be a 
portfolio of common stocks.  Hence, the REIT structure formed in 1961 represented a 
closed end structure.  This meant that REITs could issue shares to the public, while the 
value of those shares would fluctuate between the net asset value and the value of the 
REITs.  Thus, this structure developed in 1961 offered investors, especially small 
investors the opportunity to invest in real estate at reduced costs, as well as access to 
investment expertise.  These early REITs were designed as passive investment vehicles, 









owned properties.  As a result, early REITs employed independent property management 
firms or leased their properties to third parties. This structure however has changed in 
recent years as many REITs have now become management companies as well.   
Prior to the passage of the Real Estate Investment Act, small investors in entities 
could assemble a diversified liquid portfolio of stocks without having to buy mutual fund 
shares.  However, the enormous capital requirements of real estate projects excluded 
most small investors from participating in the real estate sector.  Hence, the passage of 
the Act not only made REITs the real estate equivalent of mutual funds, but also provided 
small investors with the opportunity to participate in large, professionally managed real 
estate projects, while at the same time maintain liquidity. Effectively, this Act allowed 
investors to share in the benefits offered by real estate investment, without being exposed 
to extreme risks or being subjected to the capital investments required of large scale 
commercial real estate development.  Thus, the Act created a structure that enabled 
investors, especially small investors to participate in large scale commercial real estate 
investing and/or mortgage lending and in return receive a continuous stream of returns in 
the form of dividends (Block, 1998).  Further, the Act outlined the legal structure within 
which REITs should operate by establishing certain rules which ensured that REITs 
remained similar to mutual-fund-like devices for the ownership of real estate.   
Modern day REITs are a therefore a direct creation of the Internal Revenue Code 
(Brueggeman & Fisher, 2005) and the United States Congress (Lee & Lee, 2003), and 
were designed to be pass-through entities that distribute to its shareholders a substantial 









of its assets.  It is important to note that prior to the passage of Act in 1960, investors 
could only participate in the real estate market through the purchase of real estate and not 
from the stock market.  However, once REITs were formally created, individuals, 
particularly small investors could for the first time participate in the real estate market 
through REITs, since they could now purchase stocks of real properties or real estate 
mortgages owned by these corporations.  
 In terms of the management of these early REITs most employed advisory boards 
or firms that received fees for their services which were usually calculated as a 
percentage of total assets for services rendered.  This relationship however often created 
agency problems.  This is because, many of these early REIT managers did not have any 
significant or large investments in the REIT stocks that were under their management, 
and as a result many of the management decisions were not necessarily always in the best 
interest of the REITs or shareholders (McMahan, 1994).  
 
The Growing Years-1970s 
It is important to note that during the early years (in the 1960s), the majority of 
REITs invested primarily in real property and not in mortgages.  However, by the end of 
the 1960s and the start of the 1970s, several REITs started to focus on mortgage lending 
as compared to only direct property investments.  As a result, the majority of REITs that 
were developed between 1968 and 1970 were mortgage REITs.  Overall growth in the 
number of REITs during this period was also slow, due largely in part to a decline in the 









significantly.  There are several reasons that account for this growth.  First and foremost 
is the fact that by 1970, REIT securities had started to gain acceptance on the capital 
markets as viable investment vehicles.  In addition, between the years 1968-1973, credit 
conditions had changed significantly within the United States.  This was further worsened 
by escalating interest rates, which soared to all time highs during the period.  These 
conditions resulted in a situation where there was a shortage of funds, particularly for 
construction and development.  Further, regulatory and statutory restrictions at the time 
prevented traditional lending institutions such as commercial banks, thrifts and insurance 
companies from directly engaging in the funding of construction and development 
activities.  One such restriction that these institutions faced was the fact that they were 
prevented from raising funds by paying higher interest rates to attract deposits.  As a 
result, many of these institutions resorted to establishing publicly funded REITs to fund 
these ventures.  This led to the creation of Mortgage REITs which were required to have 
75% of their holdings in financial assets such as mortgages (as compared to equity REITs 
which were required to invest 75% of their assets in real property), which took advantage 
of these opportunities to finance real estate business ventures.  The simple reason, for this 
is the fact that unlike, the traditional lending agencies, mortgage REITs interest rates 
were not regulated, and as a result, they were able to pay higher interest rates to secure 
funding to finance such ventures.  The result is that several lending institutions such as 
banks established their own mortgage REITs, to circumvent the regulatory restrictions.  
Further, these lending institutions, using their expertise, acted as third party advisors to 









mortgage REITs (Chan et al., 2003). 
Unfortunately for this new and burgeoning industry, the rapid growth of these 
lending institutions created intense competition amongst lenders, which resulted in the 
financing of questionable projects.  As a consequence, the REIT industry suffered another 
setback especially in the mortgage REIT sector.  This was due in part to the fact that the 
availability of mortgage REIT financing resulted in a situation where the market was 
effectively overbuild in a relatively short period of time in conjunction with poor 
investment decisions.  As a result, by 1973, there was an excess in the supply of real 
estate in several United States markets.  This was further exacerbated by escalating 
interest rates, propagated by inflation, as well as increases in the price of construction 
materials brought on by shortages in construction materials.  This resulted in several 
borrowers defaulting on their loans.  To make matters worse, the stringent REIT 
qualification requirements also meant that REITs could not immediately adjust 
structurally to changes in the marketplace.  For example, the REIT condition that 
restricted the ability of REITs to sell their properties within a given time frame hampered 
their ability to diversify their asset portfolios to remove or eliminate properties that 
underperformed.  Consequently, between 1973-1975, total REIT assets declined by 40% 
while the value of the total equity REIT common market declined by 68% during the 
same period (Chan et al., 2003).   
Most of the losses suffered by REITs during the 1970s were in the mortgage 
sector.  However, equity REITs performance experienced a different fate.  In fact, this 









REITs were 10% and 18% respectively.  However, by 1974, these returns had declined to 
-50% and -76%.  Conversely, during the same period, equity REIT returns were 11% at 
the end of 1972 and 57% at the end of 1974 (Imperiale, 2002).     
In response to the problems faced by REITs, the United States Congress passed 
the Tax Reform Act of 1976.  This Act included several changes in the tax structure and 
requirements as well as provisions that pertained to REITs.  However, these laws were 
clearly not designed to address the losses in REIT earnings.  For example, the new law 
required that REITs increase the dividend payout of their earnings from 90% to 95%.  
Instead, the laws were designed to create a less rigid operating environment for REITs, 
especially under the adverse economic conditions of the 1970s.  For example, the under 
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the stipulation of the 75% and 90% gross income 
requirement was somewhat relaxed.  If REITs inadvertently failed to meet these 
requirements (unlike previously), they would not automatically loose their REIT status or 
automatically be disqualified.   In addition, capital gains and operating loss treatment 
were also modified to allow REITs to record eight years of losses to be carried forward 
thereby reducing the incentive for REITs to disqualify itself.   
Under the new law also, REITs were also allowed to hold property for sale.  
However, such sale would incur a 100% excise tax on the income produced from the sale 
of such properties.  However, this excise tax would not be administered if the REIT 
followed the established criteria of limiting the number of properties that were sold as 
well as maintain the minimum four year holding period.  Further, if the REIT acted as an 









Despite these changes, several REITs opted to exit the industry and instead chose 
to operate as corporations, which allowed them to more effectively and quickly adjust to 
changes in the operating environment (Chan et al., 2003).  However, despite these 
setbacks, it has been argued that the Tax Reform Act of 1976 resulted in an improved 
REIT market with improved REIT performance and resulted in fewer risks.  This was 
largely due to the fact that the market effectively corrected itself, and those REITs that 
were inefficient exited the market (Sanger, Sirmans, & Turnbull, 1990).  Further, 
surviving REITs took advantage of the relatively lower real estate prices that resulted 
from the over built market and expanded their asset base as well as their portfolios.  This 
also resulted in several mortgage REITs, (which were the norm and quite popular during 
the early 1970s) converting to equity REITs, since many of their mortgage holders had to 
foreclose on their properties, which also effectively made these mortgage REITs holders 
the owners of these real estate assets.  Hence, the 1970s was a period highlighted by 
institutional and investor adjustments as they became acquainted with REITs as 
investment vehicles and as they learned about the performance and behavior of these 
investment vehicles, and accordingly modified their strategies to effectively deal with 
them.  
The 1970s also saw the development of various creative schemes to circumvent 
the restrictive regulations required to maintain REIT status.  One of the most restrictive 
technical requirement asserted that the management of REITs should be passive, not 
active.  This meant that a REIT could not actively participate in the day to day operation 









third parties, who in turn would pay the REIT rent for use of the property.  This process 
resulted in the REIT forfeiting some of its potential profits to the service provider or 
lessee.  The potential cash lost to the lessee was termed “leakage”. Many REITs found 
this requirement excessively restrictive and sought creative ways to reduce or eliminate 
“leakage” while at the same time exercise greater control over their assets and ultimately, 
their profit objectives. 
  One such creative REIT structure was the “Paired-Share” structure.  Paired share 
REITs were developed in the 1970s and continued through the 1980s.  This structure was 
created as a direct response to concerns about lack of control over assets and was 
therefore developed as a direct solution to the leakage problem. Under this structure, the 
REIT that owns the real property created a subsidiary operating company to operate or 
manage the real property.  The operating company would be taxed as a separate entity, 
however, it would pay most of its income to the REIT as rent.  Under this arrangement, 
the shares of both the REIT and the operating company (C-Corporation) are combined (as 
if stapled) and trade together as a unit, in equal allotments.  Paired-share REITs offer 
these advantages: 1) they complied with the REIT rules and receive the associated tax 
benefits, 2) they could invest in operationally intensive businesses, such as hotels, 3) they 
could maintain control over the assets, and 4) they provided investors with an opportunity 
to receive the full economic benefits of the investments. Any advantage lost by the REIT 
due to revenue-based leases mandated by REIT rules was retained by REIT shareholders, 
because they also owned shares in the C-Corporation operating side of the paired share 










The United States Congress eliminated the opportunity to form paired share 
REITs in 1984.  However, the same body grandfathered the existing paired-share REITs.  
Today, only five paired share REITs exist, three of which currently own and manage 
hotels (National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, Inc [NAREIT], 2006).  
The 1970s also saw the emergence of another creative REIT structure, the paper-
clip structure.  A paper clip REIT closely resembles a paired share REIT in that it 
combines a C-Corporation (operator) and a REIT (owner). In a paired share REIT, both 
companies trade as a single unit, whereas in a paper clip REIT, the two organizations are 
separate public companies but enjoy a symbiotic relationship. The two organizations are 
"paper clipped" together through an intercompany agreement that gives the operating 
company the right of first refusal to lease and manage all future real estate  acquired by 
the REIT, and provides the REIT with the right of first refusal to acquire property 
presented by the operating company.  In addition, the two companies share senior 
members of management as well as board members. These arrangements fully align the 
two companies’ interests for the benefit of both companies' shareholders (Beals & 
Arabia, 2003).   
 
Evolution and Change-1980s 
The 1980s saw the slow emergence and recovery of REITs as viable investment 
vehicles.  As can be seen in table 1, throughout the 1980s, there was a slow but steady 









75 REITs with a total market capitalization of $2.2 billion.  However, by 1989, this grew 
to a total of 120 REITs with a total market capitalization of $11.7 billion.  This growth 
was fuelled in part due to the fact that investors once again started to regain confidence in 
REITs as investment vehicles, and they once again started to grow in terms of popularity.  
In addition, investors also saw REIT stocks as greatly undervalued.  This was due largely 
in part to the fact that once REITs lost their popularity, during the 1970s, many investors 
failed to revalue their older properties in the 1980s.  In addition, most of the REIT 
managers at the time tended to adopt a rather conservative approach, in anticipation of a 
declining market (Edmunds, 1982).   
Another important and significant change that occurred with REITs that helped it 
to once again gain prominence as a viable investment vehicle is the fact that, during this 
period, REITs reduced their debts, and mortgage REITs would only lend funds to 
construction and development entities that were deemed to sound and stable, and not 
risky (Chan et al., 2003).   
The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 also had a significant impact on REITs as 
investment vehicles as it inadvertently assisted in the development of REITs.  This Act 
was initially enacted to spur the United States economy.  Essentially, the Act provided 
tax breaks for real estate investors by allowing operating loss pass through as well as 
shortened depreciation periods.  These factors attracted investors and developers who 
wanted to take advantage of the high tax shelter as well as the generous tax right off.  The 
Act also provided developers with the ability to pass off losses to investors.  In addition, 









assets value, with the overarching assumption that there would not be any further decline 
in the value of the assets, and further that the limited life of the assets ensured that 
investors could obtain a capital gain once their life was terminated.  This however, was 
not the case as it did not happen. As a result, several real estate limited partnerships were 
formed and a resultant major real estate boom ensued.  At first, these real estate limited 
partnerships had a negative impact on the REIT industry as it caused an increase in 
competition for real estate investment capital.  This once again created a situation where 
REITs were once more less popular, despite the fact that their annual average returns at 
the time (between 1981 and 1984) were more than 20% (Chan et al., 2003).  
In addition to the real estate limited partnerships, REITs also faced competition 
from another real estate development concept, the master limited partnership.  This 
concept offered investors the liquidity and investment concept that REITs offered.  In 
addition, they also offered the tax incentives that limited partnerships enjoyed.  Further, 
these types of companies also provided mortgages, diversified equity real estate 
properties as well as specialized real estate assets such as hotels and restaurants.  Thus, 
although compared to these real estate limited partnerships, the traditional REITs offered 
the ability of greater liquidity than the real estate limited partnerships.  Yet, they were not 
especially attractive to investors during the early 1980s.   
Faced with this increased competition, the REIT industry responded by 
introducing a new REIT concept, the self-liquidating, finite-life REIT, which started to 
trade publicly during the 1980s.  This type of REIT structure attempted to win investors 









period, usually ten years.  In addition to the existing benefits that the current REITs 
offered, the self-liquidating finite-life REITs offered an added advantage since these 
REITs could be liquidated or terminated if market conditions were not favorable for the 
REIT, and termination was in the best interest of the investor.  This would therefore 
improve the chance that investors would obtain capital gains once the self-liquidating 
REIT assets were liquidated.   
However, despite the implementation of these steps to allow REITs to be more 
competitive in the marketplace, the popularity of REITs as investment vehicles was once 
again saved through the direct intervention of the government, through the passage of 
legislation, the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  In fact, the recovery and reemergence of REITs 
during the 1980s has be largely attributed to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(Han & Liang, 1995;Lee & Lee, 2003) which transformed and enhanced REITs as 
competitive real estate investment vehicles by  removing the advantages previously 
enjoyed by other tax driven investments (Han & Liang, 1995).  This Act has been 
credited in launching the second REIT “boom” phase as it once again altered the 
dynamics of real estate investing and signaled the emergence of REITs as bona fide 
investment vehicles.  This Act eliminated the tax incentives offered by the Economic 
Recovery Act of 1981 (Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002).  Effectively, the Tax reform Act of 
1986 eliminated all the tax advantages enjoyed by the real estate limited partnerships and 
the master limited partnerships (many of which were tax incentive driven developments ), 
thus creating more or less a level competitive playing field.  For example, one of the 









income losses from partnerships to offset gains in other active or active income.  
However, perhaps the most significant change that this Act brought about was the 
removal of the independent contractor rule, which previously prevented REITs from 
actively participating in the management of their properties.  Instead, the provisions 
under the new Act allowed REITs to actively participate in the management and 
operation of their properties by allowing them to provide “customary services” to their 
tenants without the use of independent contractors.  This new rule therefore allowed 
REITs to exercise greater management control over their properties.   
This Act therefore eliminated the problem of leakage that had plagued the 
industry since the advent of the modern REIT in 1960.  As discusses previously, leakage 
referrers to money lost by REITs when they utilize independent contractors, or agents to 
operate their properties.  Hence, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 allowed for the first time 
the active management of properties by REITs as compared to passive management as 
was previously allowed under the pre Tax Reform Act of 1986.  This Act also resulted in 
REITs becoming more fully integrated since having an internally managed company 
reduced conflicts of interests as the goals and objectives of the REITs could be carried 
out by the management team.  Further, this also allowed for the goals of the REITs to be 
closely aligned with those of the shareholders, which ultimately results in a more 
efficiently run or operated REIT.  The new laws also made REITs attractive by removing 
the 100 shareholder requirement as well as the 5/10 rule during the REIT’s first taxable 
year of operation (Knight & Knight, 1992). 









1986 is that of structural changes within the REIT industry which were propagated by 
this Act.  One such change that occurred as a result of this Act is REITs started to reduce 
their reliance on external advisors and became more company oriented in terms of their 
overall operations (Chan, Leung, & Wang, 2005).  For the first time, REITs were allowed 
to develop and manage their own properties, whereas previously, REITs were required to 
contract the operation of their properties to third parties.  Thus, REITs had more 
flexibility and leverage in participating in the overall management of their assets is this 
less tax restrictive environment (Corgel et al., 1995).  As a result, the real estate 
investment trust market began to show signs of slow growth during the latter half of the 
1980s.  As can be seen in table 1, during the period 1985 and to 1990, REITs remain 
somewhat stable in terms of their average size while market capitalization and total 
number grew from $7,674 million to $8,737.10 million, and 82 REITs to 119 REITs 
respectively.    
In 1989, REIT growth, development and popularity as investment vehicles got an 
indirect boost when the Resolution Trust Corporation was created to assist the faltering 
saving and loans banks and other lending institutions.  This action resulted in REIT 
shares  being sold by banks that held these shares at a low price which attracted investors 
into the REIT market (Lee & Lee, (2003), which resulted in the REIT market 
experiencing a Bull market starting in 1991 (Block & French, 2002).   
As REITs started to mature as viable investment vehicles, other changes in their 
structure were also noted.  By the late 1980s REITs compared to their predecessors of the 









2001; Chan, Erickson, & Wang, 2003).  REIT portfolios of the late 1980s and beyond 
also tend to focused more on specific property types such as industrial, office, retail, 
residential, diversified lodging, self storage, health care, and specialty (Capozza & 
Seguin, 2001) and had larger amount of inside ownership than their predecessors 
(Capozza & Seguin, 2003).  Most important in terms of their evolution, the REITS of the 
late 1980s and beyond progressed from their fund like structure and displayed 
characteristics similar to those of other firms trading on the stock market (Chan et al. 
2005).   
The passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 also resulted in a fundamental shift 
not only in the structure of REITs, but also in the types of investors who were attracted to 
REITs.  Initially, when the Real Estate Reform Act was passed in 1960, the rules were 
designed specifically to attract small investors to participate in the real estate market 
(Chan et al., 2005).  Hence, during the early period, there were relatively few institutional 
investors such as retirement funds and financial analysts actively participating in the 
REIT market, compared to the stock market as a whole.  The reason for this is the fact 
that generally, institutional investors are usually attracted to and will invest in companies 
that are large, liquid and have a clearly defined and focused business line.  The early 
REITs clearly did not display such characteristics.   However, the passage of the Tax 
Reform Act in 1986 created the necessary changes that not only continued to attract small 
investors, but also institutional investors who welcomed the structural changes which 
were now desirable.   As a result, over the past two decades, a significant amount of 









direct real estate investment combined with the fact that the REITs market offers the 
added benefit of greater liquidity.   
 
Maturity: The 1990s and Beyond 
The start of the 1990s clearly mirrored the four decade history of REITs, decline 
followed by substantial growth.  For example, as can be seen in table 1, the market 
capitalization of REITs fell from $11.6 billion in 1989 to 8.7 billion in 1990.  This was 
due largely in part to the fact that by the late 1980s, the market was over supplied because 
of the large number of properties that entered the market by failed banks and savings and 
loans.  This resulted in or caused real estate prices as well as REIT returns to be 
depressed.  However, despite this rather slow start, the 1990s and beyond saw the 
exponential and unparalleled growth and maturity of REITs as stable investment vehicles, 
as investors once again regained confidence in their potential as viable investment 
vehicles.  In fact, by 1998, the total number of publicly traded REITs had grown from 
119 in 1990 with market capitalization of only $8.7 billion to 210, with a total market 
capitalization of $138 billion.  By 2005, the total number of REITs had grown to 197, 
with a total market capitalization of $330.6 billion.  As can be seen in table 1, the 
majority of growth occurred in the equity REIT segment of the industry.  This segment 
increased from 58 in 1990, to 152 at the end of 2005.  During the same period, the 
number of mortgage and hybrid REITs combined were 61 in 1990, however, by the end 
of 2005, there were only 45 mortgage and hybrid REITs combined (NAREIT, 2006).   









attributed to the relatively lower returns of these types of REITs compared to the returns 
obtained from equity REITs.  In addition, these types of REITs were also deemed to be 
extremely volatile compared to equity REITs.  The poor performance of mortgage REITs 
was also attributed to high leverage combined with the types of properties that lending 
institutions were funding.  Further, mortgage REITs had little incentives to prevent 
foreclosures or renegotiate loans to prevent foreclosures (Brown, 2000).   As a 
consequence, several foreclosed properties were purchased by equity REITs, which 
obviously resulted in a decline in mortgage REITs, and an increase in equity REITs.  
Hence, low property prices propelled the growth of equity REITs.   
Several government interventions in the form of legislations also contributed to 
the growth of the REIT industry during the 1990s as well.  The first was the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (also called the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993) 
which, for the first time made REITs attractive to institutional investors such as pension 
funds.  Prior to the passage of this Act, REITs were required to follow the 5/50 rule 
which stipulated that no fewer than five individuals could own more than 50% of all the 
combined outstanding shares of a REIT.  This rule meant that REITs were not attractive 
to institutional investors such as pension funds since, these funds comprised the 
investment of several hundred or thousands of investors, who (under this rule) were 
essentially counted as one investor in REIT funds.  The Omnibus Budget reconciliation 
Act of 1993 modified this rule and allowed pension funds to count each individual 
investor for the purpose of REIT investment, once the REIT had at least 100 investors.   









investors as well as investment banking firms.   
The other significant change that accounted for the popularity and growth of 
REITs during the period was the development and introduction of the Umbrella 
partnership REIT (UPREIT) structure in 1992.  This structure comprised two 
components- the REIT itself and the operating partnership.  The REIT is the component 
that issues stocks to the public and owns properties while under the operating partnership 
relationship, the REIT usually owns or purchase an operating interest in a partnership.  
Hence, under this arrangement, REITs were allowed to own their properties indirectly 
through the operating partnerships (Beals & Arabia, 2003).   
The 1990s also marked the specialization of REITs by property types, namely, 
retail, hotels/lodging, apartments, offices and industrial properties, shopping malls, self-
storage properties etc.  Along with this trend of REITs focusing on specific property 
types was also the fact that the management of REITs became more focused, specialized 
and increasingly more knowledgeable.  Thus, during the 1990s and beyond, REIT 
properties as a whole were improved in their overall managerial efficiency and 
capabilities.   
Another significant pair of legislations that had a positive effect of the REIT 
industry during the period was the REIT Simplification Act of 1997 and the REIT 
modernization Act of 1999.  Amongst other things, the REIT Simplification Act of 1997 
removed the requirement that a REIT cannot earn more than 30% of its gross income 
from the sale of assets that are not held as long term investments.  The REIT 









Simplification Act by allowing REITs to own taxable subsidiaries to provide services to 
their tenants without loosing their status as a REIT, which removed the problem of 
leakage previously encountered.  In addition, the REIT Modernization Act reduced the 
amount of taxable earnings distribution requirement from 95% to 90%.   
 
History and Evolution Summary 
Changes in the United States tax laws over the past four decades have 
significantly affected the growth and development of the REIT industry and have resulted 
in the industry becoming more viable and efficient as investment vehicles.  These 
changes have resulted in REITs becoming more attractive as investment vehicles both to 
individual small investors as well as institutional investors.  The REITs of today are 
therefore the direct creation of government legislations, and accordingly have evolved 
and grew as a result of changes in government legislations.   
Since their inception over a century ago, the REIT industry and REIT structure 
have undergone significant changes and have evolved significantly to become the viable 
investment vehicles they are today.  In recent years, most of the changes and 
modifications of current tax laws that have impacted REITs have resulted in this 
investment vehicle becoming more efficient, competitive and attractive.  This is because, 
over a forty year period, these changes have effectively removed some of the burdensome 
and confusing rules, regulations and restrictions that existed during the early years of 
REIT development.  In addition, REITs have become more specialized, and many have 









industry.  It is this specialization that has enabled REITs to become more efficient. 
As the popularity and efficiency of REITs have increased, they have attracted 
large institutional investors, such as pension funds.  This shift in investors is 
revolutionary since, initially, REITs were developed to allow small investors to 
participate in the real estate market.  In addition to the change in investors, the number of 
REITs within each REIT category has shifted as well.  For example, in 1975, equity 
REITs accounted for only 26% of the overall REIT market while mortgage REITs 
accounted for 47%.  However, thirty years later, this ratio changed to 77% for equity 
REITs while mortgage REITS accounted for only 18%.  The market capitalization for 
both sectors has also changed significantly during the same period.  In 1975, mortgage 
REITs accounted for 35% of the overall market while equity REITs accounted for 31%.  
However, by 2005, equity REITs accounted for 92% while mortgage REITs accounted 
for only 7 % (percentages were calculated from the data presented in table 1).     
As one examines the growth and evolution of REITs in the United States, it 
becomes clear that the evolution of REITS as viable investment vehicles in can be 
separated into three distinct “boom” periods.  Following the passage of the Real Estate 
Investment Trust Act, the “first generation” of modern REITs was formed and did not 
gain prominence as investment vehicles until the late 1960’s.  This was due largely in 
part to the fact that the Federal Reserve Board increased interest rates in 1968 in an effort 
to reduce inflation (Mullaney, 1998).  Although this action spurred the US economy, it 
prevented commercial banks from competing for investor’s capital.  Further, at the time, 









consequence, many investors sought new ways to invest their money and sought higher 
paying money markets and bonds.  This opened the door for REITs since banks which 
historically funded the construction industry could no longer do so because they had 
fewer deposits.  This event therefore launched the mortgage REIT industry as shareholder 
funds were invested through direct lending to real estate projects as well as through the 
purchase of real estate portfolios.  By 1968, there were three mortgage trusts, which sold 
seventy-three million dollars in new shares.  REIT growth during this period was 
attributed to an increase in demand for construction and real estate development 
financing, which could not be met by existing financial institutions.  As a consequence, 
mortgage REITs were developed to satisfy the unfulfilled need for financing (Han & 
Liang, 1995).   
By 1970, REITs had raised over one billion dollars (Mullaney, 1998).  Thus, 
during the early stages of REIT growth, the majority of REITs were mortgage REITs 
which were developed to satisfy the need for commercial real estate financing.  The 
growth of mortgage REITs continued until the mid 1970’s when many became defunct 
because of poor management (which resulted in poor underwriting) and rising inflation 
which left mortgage REITs with no choice but to liquidate their assets.  The fate of 
mortgage REITs was further worsened by the fact that the supply of commercial real 
estate exceeded the demand for commercial real estate.  This resulted in many real estate 
investors defaulting on their loans since many commercial buildings went un-rented, 
leading to a decline in the value of mortgage trusts shares.  These situations combined 









on their loans and left them with no choice but to liquidate their assets (Corgel, McIntosh, 
& Ott, 1995).   
REITs continued to grow throughout the 1970’s and were able to secure funding 
through stock and debt underwritings as well as from commercial banks.  This growth 
during the 1970’s was tempered by rising interest rates during the period as well as the 
1973 oil crisis. As a consequence, REITs experienced negative returns of -29.35 per cent 
in 1974 and -49.82 per cent in 1975 (Lee & Lee, 2003).  REIT development was further 
affected by the decline in construction and development loans, which fell from 53 per 
cent of total assets in 1972 to six percent in 1984 (Lee & Lee,2003).  Further, as indicated 
in table 1, the total market capitalization of REITs declined from $1,494.3 in 1971 to all 
time lows of $712.4 millions in 1974 and $899.7 million in 1975.  This was somewhat a 
reversal of the general trend in the commercial banking sector as rather than compete 
with REITs, banks were now providing financing for REITS.  As a consequence, bank 
loans rose from 11% of total REITs in 1969 to 56% of total REIT assets by 1974 
(National Association of Real Estate Investments Trusts, 1978).   
During the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, there was a substantial growth in the 
number of REITs.  This growth was propagated by the fact that there was a large demand 
for financing to fund construction and real estate development.  However, commercial 
banks at the time were unable to effectively fund and finance these ventures (Han & 
Liang, 1995).  As a result, REIT popularity grew within the capital market and they 
became an alternative source for financing real estate ventures.  The result was that 









increase (Haight & Fort, 1987).   Since most of the REITs in the 1970’s were mortgage 
REITs, they were susceptible to the same negative leverage as their banking rivals which 
meant that when interest rates rose in the mid 1970’s, their fixed rate loans declined in 
value.  The effect on REITs was that many builders who had received REIT financing to 
start construction were unable to complete them and defaulted on their loans (New York 
Institute of Finance, 1988).  As a result, thirty REITs became defunct, and the value of 
the industry as a whole declined from almost twenty billion to less than ten billion 
dollars, while the number of dividend paying REITS declined from 154 in 1973 to 68 in 
1975 (New York Institute of Finance, 1988).  In fact, this event damaged the reputation 
of the REIT industry and caused it to loose its prominence in the capital market 
community as a major force for the next twenty years (Beals & Arabia, 2003).   
The REIT industry did not recover until the 1980’s when the second “boom” in 
the REIT industry occurred, due largely to the recovery of the real estate market.  To spur 
the economy, the Economic Recovery Act was passed in 1981.  This Act allowed for 
shorter depreciation schedules for real property as well as allowed for the pass through of 
tax losses to investors, who in turn were able to utilize those losses to reduce their 
personal income tax liabilities.  This therefore favored partnerships more than REITS and 
as a result, over eighty billion dollars were raised by real estate limited partnerships 
during the 1980’s (Mullaney, 1998).  However, although REITs were not active players 
in the market at this time, they ultimately benefited from the situation.  The reason for 
this is that The Economic Recovery Act created a situation where investors wanting to 









situation where the real estate market became overbuilt.  This was worsened by the Gulf 
war which caused the United States economy to decline and left many real estate owners 
illiquid, defaulting on their debt service.  Many owners had no choice but to recapitalize 
their holdings as REITs, thereby gaining liquidity and maintaining their assets and were 
able to enjoy the increase in their assets value towards the end of the decade.  In fact, 
REIT shares acted as “currency” to exchange for distressed properties (Beals & Arabia, 
2003).   
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the REIT industry underwent significant 
structural-revise changes.  For example, during the period, as indicated in table 1, average 
market capitalization of all publicly traded REITs doubled from $40.9 million in 1972 to 
over $86 million by 1984.  This period also marked the growth of the industry’s stock 
market value which grew from $15.6 billion in 1992 to $45 billion by the end of 1994.  
At the end of 2005, REITs had market capitalization in excess of $330 billion (National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, Inc, 2006).   On the negative side, this 
growth occurred despite the fact that leverage (short term debt) of REITs declined from 
64 % in 1972 to 55 % in 1984 (Han & Liang, 1995).  Further, construction and real estate 
development loans declined from 53 % of total assets in 1972 to only 6 % in 1984 (Lee & 
Lee, 2003).    
The third and final distinct “boom” phase began in the early 1990s as many 
REITs began to go public and marked the exponential growth of REITs.  This growth 
was driven by the fact that during the period, many savings and loans which held the 









attributed to several factors.  The first was the Revenue Reconciliation Act which 
removed several barriers and made REITs more attractive especially to institutional 
investors such as mutual funds (Yobaccio, Rubens, & Ketcham, 1995; Crain, Cudd, & 
Brown, 2000) as well as portfolio diversification (Giliberto, 1990; Ori, 1995).  The 
second reason is that investors saw the economic benefits to be derived by combining 
their resources and in the process obtain the benefits of commercial real estate investing 
(Han & Liang, 1995).  The final reason is that investors also perceived that REIT 
ownership would provide inflation hedging ability (Chatrath & Liang, 1998).    
The evolution and growth of REITs as viable investment vehicles continued in the 
1990’s with the passage of the of the REIT modernization Act in 1999.   This Act was 
designed to enable REITs to compete effectively with other commercial real estate 
entities and other business formations.  Prior to the passage of this Act, REITs were 
barred from providing services that were deemed to be beyond those classified as “usual 
and customary” within the industry.  If a REIT violated this stipulation and provided 
services that were outside the boundaries of the classification of “usual and customary”, 
then the income generated by the REIT would not qualify as income derived from a 
REIT, which meant that the REIT would therefore loose its REIT status.  The REIT 
modernization Act also allowed for the REIT subsidiary companies to provide all 
services to their tenant or clients pay associated taxes and pass the earnings up to the 
parent REIT as income.  The Act also reduced the required payout of gross income from 










TYPES OF REITS 
Public REITs 
Real estate investment trusts exist in two broad categories, publicly traded REITs, 
which are those that are listed on an exchange or traded over the counter and private 
REITs which are those that are not listed nor traded publicly.  Publicly traded REITs are 
further classified by their investment sector as equity real estate investment trust, 
mortgage real estate investment trusts, and hybrid real estate investment trusts.  Equity 
real estate investment trusts are those that acquire property interest while mortgage real 
estate investment trusts are those that purchase mortgage obligations and consequently 
become a creditor with mortgage liens given to priority equity holders.  Essentially, 
mortgage REITs owns mortgage paper secured by the underlying real property.  Hybrid 
REITs are those that combine the advantages of both the mortgage REITs and the equity 
REITs. 
The majority of equity REITs usually specialize in specific property types, and in 
some cases, they tend to focus their investments in specific geographic locations.  This 
specialization is usually geared towards gaining competitive advantages by focusing 
resources on specific property types as well as within specific geographic areas.  
However, a small percentage of equity REITs chooses not to specialize, and instead 
choose to diversify their portfolios both in terms of property types and geographic 
locations.  The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT, 2006) 
further classifies or breaks equity REITs down by property specialization or property 









the following property types: 
Industrial/Office:  Office building and industrial REITs are classified collectively as one 
segment since a substantial amount of REITs invests in both types of properties. This 
classification usually describes buildings that are used for the production or manufacture 
of products as well as properties whose functions is distribution or warehousing.  
Included in this category also are buildings that are used to house offices which are 
rented to tenants by the REIT.  The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trust 
further divides this segment into REITs that own industrial, office, or a mix of office and 
industrial properties.  These properties are often further dived based on their location 
such as whether they are located in the Central Business District or situated in suburban 
locations.  Buildings may also be classified by subjective levels of quality.  Under this 
classification, buildings are classified as class A, B, or C.  Class A buildings are those 
that offer excellent location and access, the facilities are relatively new and in excellent 
conditions which allow the REIT to charge rents that are highly competitive.  Class B 
buildings also offer good locations and are in good physical condition.  However, they 
tend to suffer from some functional obsolescence and physical deterioration.  Class C 
buildings are those that suffer from physical deterioration and functional obsolescence.   
 Retail: These are REITs that focus on retail outlets.  These REITs are further subdivided 
into those that own strip centers, regional malls, outlet centers, and free standing retail 
properties. 
Residential: These are REITs that own residential dwellings consisting of five or more 









into those that own multifamily apartments and manufactured home communities. 
Diversified: These are REITs that own a portfolio of diversified property types.   
Lodging/Resorts: These are REITs that own a variety of hotels, motels and resorts. 
Health Care: These are REITs that specialize in owning hospitals and related healthcare 
facilities and are usually leaders to private healthcare providers who operate these 
facilities.   
Self Storage: these are REITs that specialize in self storage facilities.   
Specialty:  Specialty REITs are real estate investment trust companies that specialize in 
various types of properties which include correctional facilities such as prisons, theatres, 
golf courses, automobile dealerships, and timberland.   
 
Finite-Life REITs and Non-Finite Life REITs 
In addition to the various categories of equity REITs discussed above, REITs can 
also be further classified and categorized by variables such as the duration of the trust 
such as finite-life REITs and nonfinite life REITs.  Finite life or self liquidating REITs as 
they are commonly called are REITs that are formed with the goal being to dispose all the 
company’s assets and distribute all proceeds to the company’s shareholders by a specific 
date.  Finite life REITs were developed in response to investor criticism that the prices of 
REIT shares act or behave like common stock in that the price is based on the current and 
expected future earnings rather than the real estate value of the REIT.  By establishing a 
finite or terminal date, investors it is argued can make a better estimate of the terminal 









going concern entities.  Most of today’s REITs are non-finite life REITs.   
 
Private REITs 
Private REITs are real estate investment trust companies that are not listed on one 
of the established security markets.  Although most of these companies are public 
entities, they are not listed on public exchanges or traded over the counter as most public 
REITs.  This category of REIT is not registered with the Securities exchange 
Commission.  The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trust classifies private 
REITs into three categories: (1) REITs targeted towards institutional investors; (2) REITs 
that are syndicated to investors as part of a package offered by a financial consultant; (3) 
“incubator” REITs which are REIT that are funded by venture capitalists who expects 
that the REIT will develop and garner an excellent track record to launch a public 
offering in the future.    
Unlisted REITs 
A third and relatively new segment of REITs are those that are classified as 
unlisted REITs.  This segment of REITs file with the Security Exchange Commission, 
however, their shares do not trade on public national stock exchanges.  Unlike publicly 
traded REITs, which offer a high level of liquidity, unlisted REITs usually require a 
minimum holding period.  Exit strategies for investors are usually linked to a required 
liquidation after some period of time (usually ten years).  Although opponents of unlisted 
REITs argue that from the perspective of investors, they are expensive and illiquid when 









are not subjected to the market volatility that publicly traded REITs are subjected to 
(Brueggeman & Fisher, 2005).   
 
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF REITS 
Legal Requirements 
Real estate investment trusts are real estate companies that choose to qualify 
under a set of tax provisions established by the Internal Revenue Code.  Compliance with 
these set of tax provisions enable the company to become a pass-through entity that 
distributes a substantial amount of its earnings in addition to any capital gains that is 
generated from the disposition of its assets to its investors.  REIT taxation is govern 
under Internal Revenue Code Section 856-858, which requires all real estate investment 
trust meeting the tax requirements to qualify as a REIT to act as a conduit with respect to 
income distributed to beneficiaries of the trust.  The tax provisions under which REITs 
are established specifies that REITs do not pay taxes on its earnings.  However, the 
earnings distributed represents dividend income to shareholders and are taxed 
accordingly.  Thus, REIT corporations are not taxed on distributed taxable income when 
it qualifies for the special tax benefit.  In addition, all capital gains are taxed at the 
shareholder’s applicable rate.  Real estate investment trusts have characteristics that are 
similar to those of mutual funds and by law are not required to pay corporate income 
taxation on earnings distributed to shareholders.  Thus, if an entity qualifies as a REIT, it 
does not pay corporate taxes, which means that REITs do not have the double taxation 









While the favorable tax treatment has made REITs attractive as investment 
vehicles, in recent years this benefit has come into question.  For example, Gyourko & 
Sinai, (1999) argued that the net tax benefit of REIT structures is between 2-5 percent of 
the industry market capitalization.  Further, they argued that because real estate that is 
owned by individuals or owned through partnerships is also not taxed at the corporate 
level, the REIT structure has no tax advantage compared to private unincorporated 
holdings (Gyourko & Sinai, 1999).   
 
Asset requirements 
At least 75 percent of the value of a REIT’s asset must consist of real estate 
assets, cash, and government securities.  This means that unlike C corporations, REITs do 
not have the freedom to own or mange any type of assets (Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002).   
• No more that 5 percent of the value of assets may comprise securities of any one 
issuer if the securities are not includable under the 75 percent test. 
• REITs cannot hold more than 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities of 
any one issuer if those securities are not includable under the 75 percent test. 




• At least 75 percent of gross income must be derived from rents, interest on 









attributable to investments in other REITs. 
• No more than 30 percent of the REIT’s gross income can be derived from the sale 
or disposition of stock or securities held for less than six months or real property 
held for less than four years except for property involuntarily converted or 
foreclosed on.   
 
Distribution Requirement 
• At least 90 percent of REIT’s taxable income (this was changed by the REIT 
modernization Act of 1999 from 95%) must be distributed to shareholders on an 
annual basis. This means that in order for REITs to expand, they must seek 
external funding sources since they do not retain the majority of their income 
(Beals & Arabia, 1998).   
 
Stock and Ownership Requirement 
• The REIT must be structured as a corporation, business trust, or similar 
association.  The REIT must be taxable as a corporation.  
• Must be managed by a board of directors or trustees. 
• Be an investor in real estate, as opposed to a broker. 
• Shares in the REIT must be fully transferable and must be held by a minimum of 
100 persons, with  no more than five of these owning more than a combined 50% 
of the trust’s outstanding shares (the “5/50 rule”).   









during the last half of a taxable year. 
 
REIT Status Termination and Penalties 
If a REIT fails to comply with the real estate investment trust qualifying 
requirements, or if it decides to terminate its status as a REIT, then the corporation will 
effectively terminate its status to be taxed as a REIT in subsequent years.  Once a 
company loses its status as a REIT, it cannot elect to be taxed as a REIT until a period of 
five years has passed after the termination date.  However, if the company’s status as a 
REIT was terminated because of failure to comply with the qualifying requirements, it 
has the opportunity to regain its status as a REIT within the five year time frame if it can 
prove to the Internal Revenue Service that its failure to comply was due to reasonable 
cause and not because of willful actions or neglect.  Other penalties for compliance 
failures include disqualification of a portion of the REIT’s earnings from tax-exempt 
treatment at the corporate level.   
 
REIT TAXATION AND DIVIDENDS 
By law, REITs are not required to pay federal or most state income taxes.  
However, to receive this exemption, the current law requires that a REIT payout 90 
percent of its earnings in the form of dividends to its shareholders.  These dividends are 
taxable to the individual investor.  Hence, this special tax treatment allows REIT 
shareholders to avoid the double taxation that is usually associated with normal 









The high and required dividend payout leads to one of the most important 
investment characteristic of REITs.  They usually have yields that are well above average 
and are excellent investments for investors seeking high income.  REITs also have the 
added advantage in that they enjoy the high liquidity of publicly traded stocks.  This is 
important since direct investment in real estate is not liquid.  For example, while stocks in 
REITs can be traded or sold at a moment’s notice, the same cannot be done with real 
property.  Thus, REITs investors benefit from the liquidity of owning the real estate via 
REITs.   
Although the tax exemption is attractive for investors, it has its drawback.  
Corporations generally retain a substantial portion of their income to reinvest in the 
business, which allows the company to grow.  However, the fact that REITs are required 
by law to pay out 90% of their taxable income means that only a small portion of the 
company’s income is left for reinvestment purposes.  Growth can therefore occur only 
through the selling of new share in the company, which means that the ownership of the 
current shareholders is diluted which also means that the individual shareholder does not 
benefit from this growth in terms of stock appreciation (stock appreciation may occur in 
the long run).  Hence, it follows therefore that REITs should be considered as income 
vehicles rather than as growth stocks.   
 
MANAGEMENT OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
The majority of REITs are managed actively as operating companies and the 









externally by a management company that works for the benefit of the REIT 
shareholders.  REITs usually invest in specific geographic areas and in specific property 
types since this specialization allows REIT shareholders to benefit from the specialize 
expertise of the management company and its management team.    
 Prior to the passage of the Economic Reform Act of 1986, there were 
management restrictions of REITs which ensured that the management of REITs was 
passive, and not active.  As a result, trustees, directors and other REIT employees were 
not allowed to actively engage in managing or operating REIT properties, providing 
services to REIT tenants, or even collecting rent from tenants of REIT properties.  
Instead, these services were contracted out to independent entities.  However, the passage 
of the Economic Reform Act in 1986 relaxed this restriction, making it possible for 
REITs to offer normal maintenance and customary services for tenants, which effectively 
eliminated the need for such services to be undertaken by outside, independent 
contractors.  Thus, the passage of this Act meant that for the first time, REITs could 
internalize such functions, thereby creating vertically integrated operating companies, 
which altered REITs as investment vehicles.   
 Prior to the passage of the Economic Reform Act of 1986, most REITs were 
organized or sponsored by financial institutions such as insurance companies, 
commercial banks, or mortgage bankers.  This sponsoring institution also provided 
advising services to the REIT directly or indirectly through affiliates.  Advisors were also 
charged with the responsibility of managing the operations of the REIT, which included 









Once this Act was passed in 1986, REITs became more attractive especially for real 
estate developers who previously were not interested in passive real estate investment.  
This Act also resulted in a fundamental shift in REIT ownership, as real estate developers 
became the major sponsor of REITs.  The reason for this shift is that real estate 
developers could now provide the internal management and advising required to 
maximize the return on their investment.  Thus, as a result of the 1986 Act, today’s 
REITs have active and not passive management, which has made them attractive to 
investors.  Hence, most of the REITs today are self advised, vertically integrated 
operating companies that actively mange their portfolios, with the ultimate goal being 
cash flow and portfolio growth.  This Act therefore marked a fundamental shift from the 
previous structure of passive management.     
 
THE APPEAL OF REITS AS INVESTMENT VEHICLES 
Several reasons have been forwarded as to why REITs appeal to investors as 
viable investment vehicles and have consequently led to their increased popularity and 
securitization in recent years.  While some researchers have attributed this increased in 
popularity to factors such as the overall increase in demand for real estate securities by 
investors as well as the increase in the supply of real estate available for securitizations 
(Crain, Cudd, & Brown, 2000), others have argued that the appeal of REITs as 
investment vehicles is partly due to their ability to act as hedge against inflation (Chatrath 
& Liang, 1998).  The assertion that REITs act as hedge against inflation has, however 









Sanders, 1990; Chatrath & Liang, 1998).  However, despite these mixed findings, the 
perception that REITs provide a hedge against inflation has also added to the popularity 
of REITs a viable investment vehicles.  However, other reasons that account for their 
appeal as viable investment vehicles have been met will less debate.  Below are the less 
debatable common reasons that account for the appeal of REITs as viable investment 
vehicles.   
REITs have become attractive investment vehicles since they offer both small and 
large investors the opportunity to invest directly or indirectly in real estate.  Hence REITs 
are often considered as substitutes or a viable alternative to directly investing in real 
property (Venmore-Rowland, 1989).  Essentially, real estate investment trusts allow 
investors with limited capital the ability to invest in real property stocks as a way of 
gaining property exposure without the introduction of excessive illiquidity (Liow, 1997).  
Thus, individual investors can indirectly acquire real estate investment through the 
purchase of publicly traded shares in REITs or for larger investors, through the process of 
directly acquiring real property or through lending as in the case of mortgage REITs.  
Further, the fact that large amounts of resources and expertise are required for the 
financing and ownership of commercial real estate, effectively exclude many investors 
from directly participating in the acquisition or investing in commercial real estate 
market.  REIT ownership however does not require large financial outlay nor the long 
term commitment required of commercial real estate investment, and hence allows small 
investors the opportunity to participate in the real estate market.  Additionally, because 









owner to another at relatively low transactional costs.  The end result is that investors, 
especially small investors can collectively combine or pool their resources and participate 
in the real estate market, thereby obtaining both real estate ownership and the economic 
benefits offered by commercial real estate investments (Han & Liang, 1995).   
Real estate investment trust are also attractive since compared to other equity 
investments, such as partnerships, they offer investors the added benefit of a greater level 
of liquidity, while at the same time allow them to earn a relatively high return on their 
investment.  This is because, unlike most investments, by law, REITs are required to 
disburse ninety percent of their gross income to shareholders on annual basis. Hence, 
REIT investors can look forward to reliable and significant dividends which are typically 
four times higher on average than those of other stocks.  Investors can therefore build 
greater long-term wealth by combining REIT stocks with other investments such as home 
ownerships as part of a diversified investment portfolio.  Additionally, REITs are also 
attractive to investors since this investment vehicle allows them to benefit from the single 
taxation nature of REITs earnings.   
 REITs also offer investors the opportunity to invest funds in a diversified 
portfolio of real estate, with the assurance that their investment will be monitored and 
managed by a professional team.  Thus, REIT investors own equity shares on organized 
exchanges which provide more liquidity as compared to acquiring real property.  Further, 
since investors have the opportunity to pool their resources with individuals that have 
similar interests, funds are usually acquired relatively quickly to purchase real property in 









estate development companies can circumvent creditors by securing financing through 
equity capital by forming publicly traded REITs (Gyourko, 1994).   
Another factor that has accounted for the popularity of REITs is an important 
structural change of REITs that occurred with the introduction of the Umbrella 
Partnership REIT (UPREIT) in 1992 (Mullaney, 1998).  This type of REIT was designed 
to allow real estate owners who are interested in taking their real estate operations public 
the opportunity to do so without incurring the exorbitant and often prohibitive capital 
gains taxes that were typical before this structure was allowed.  
REITs have also grown in popularity because of the interest and investment of 
institutional investors (largely propagated by the tax changes brought by the Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1993), who now see REITs as viable investment vehicle.  Prior to 
the passage of this Act, REITs had to comply with a tax provision referred to as the “five 
or fewer rule”.  This tax stipulation stated that an entity would loose its status as a REIT 
if more than 50 percent of the REIT’s shares were held by five or less shareholders 
during the last half of a taxable year (Crain et al., 2000).  This restriction therefore 
prevented several institutional investors, such as pension funds from actively investing in 
REITs.  This is because, prior to the passage of the Act, institutional investors were 
regarded as single investors for the purpose of the “five or fewer rule”.  Since most 
REITs have a relatively small market capitalization, it was virtually impossible for large 
institutional investors to obtain investment positions within REITs without violating the 
“five or fewer rule”.  Once this barrier was removed, investment activities by institutional 









trust was also propagated by the fact that during the mid 1990’s, both external equity and 
as well as debt financing were easily available to REITs (Mooradian & Yang, 2001) 
Since the passage of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960, the REIT 
industry has undergone a tremendous and dramatic growth, both in size and importance, 
especially during the last decade.  This growth has been recognized by leading financial 
markets and institutions.  For example, in 2001, Standard & Poor’s recognized the 
evolution and growth of the REIT industry as a mainstream investment by adding REITs 
to its major indices, including the S&P 500 (NAREIT, 2006).   
 
LODGING REITs 
Since their introduction to the public in 1993, lodging or hotel REITs as they are 
sometimes called, have grown significantly in terms of numbers, from two at the start of 
1993, to a total of nineteen at the end of 2005, and capitalization, from $100 million (Gu 
& Kim, 2003), to an estimated equity market capitalization of $17,617,000,000 (National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 2006).  This growth has both increased the 
cash flow into the lodging industry while at the same time changed the real estate 
ownership structure within the lodging industry (Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002).  The growth 
of this equity REIT sector has occurred despite the fact that the proportion of 
unsystematic risk in the total risk of lodging REIT stocks were found to be 84% (Kim et 
al.), which exceeds the United States national average by 14% (Gu & Kim, 1998).  
Lodging REITs also account for an estimated 5% of the NAREIT equity index 









Gu et al. (2003), suggest that there are four reasons that account for the growth of 
hotel REITs in terms of their absolute numbers as well as their market capitalization.  
First, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 included legislations that eliminated tax 
hurdles, thereby making sizeable investments in equity REITs such as hotel REITs more 
attractive to institutional investors.  The second reason suggested by Gu et al. (2003) is 
the fact that the hotel industry rebounded in 1992 from depressed occupancy rates 
brought on by the wanton real estate overbuilding in the previous decade, which caused 
the lodging industry’s average occupancy level to decline from 70.6 % in 1980, to under 
62% by 1989 (Mullaney, 1998).  In addition, the economic recession which affected the 
United States economy between 1991 and 1992 also caused occupancy and average room 
rates to decline.  Once the recession was over, hotels once again became profitable as 
average occupancy and average daily rate rose steadily after 1993.  In fact, between the 
end of 1992 and the end of 1996, demand for hotel rooms increased by more than 2.5% 
annually.  As a result of this improved performance, hotel REITs were the most 
financially rewarding investments in the REIT marketplace for the years 1995 and 1996 
(Mullaney, 1998).   
The third reason cited was based on investment decision making.  According to 
Gu et al. (2003), prudent investors viewed REITs as a way of combining financial 
resources and in so doing, profit from the benefits of commercial real estate investment.  
In the process, such investors inadvertently contributed to the growth of hotel REITs.  
Knight  & Knight (1993), accentuated this point by arguing that hotel investors purchased 









because of the constant flow of dividends and property value increases.  Knight et al. 
(2003), further argued that the notion also existed amongst hotel investors that as REITs 
became profitable, the dividends generated could be reinvested in the company, thereby 
increasing each investor’s stock value.   
The final argument purported by Gu & Kim, (2003) for the rapid growth of 
lodging REITs during the 1990s and beyond was the fact that investors perceived REITs 
on a whole as providing investments that would offer them inflation-hedging abilities.  
This argument is supported by other researchers (Chatrath & Liang, 1998; Yobaccio et 
al., 1995) who also noted that REITs are attractive because they enable investors to 
diversify their portfolios (Giliberto, 1990; Ori, 1995; Grissom, Kuhle, & Walther, 1978). 
 Despite the emergence of lodging REITs since 1993, momentum and growth did 
not take place until 1995, when the Chief Executive officer of Starwood Capital, Barry 
Sternlicht acquired Hotel Investor’s Trust, which at the time was one of four paired-
shared or stapled REITs structures that predated the 1984 ban by Congress of this type of 
REIT.  In June 1994, Hotel Investors Trust was purchased by Starwood Capital and 
merged to form Starwood Hotels and Resorts Trust.  Prior to this acquisition, Hotel 
Investors Trust had recorded a series of losses between the years 1991 through 1994.  
However, once the merger and creation of Starwood Hotels and Resorts was formed, 
there was an immediate financial turnaround.  In fact, in 1995 and 1996, Starwood’s 
annual returns of 77.9% and 93.2% represented the highest of all major equity REITs 
(Pablo, 1996).  Thus, Starwood Hotels and Resorts heralded the emergence and 









Westin, Ciga, and ITT which included Sheraton, Dessert Inn, and Caesars.  Other lodging 
companies such as Patriot American Hospitality quickly realized the overall potential of 
the paired shared structure and formed their own REIT.  Although the United States 
Congress outlawed the paired share structure, several other lodging companies took 
advantage of this paired share structure.  
 Prior to the identification of this possibility, hotel companies were reluctant to 
convert to REITs as they were plagued by the problem of leakage of revenue, since the 
“passive” component of the REIT requirement essentially prevented REITs from 
managing their own hotels.  The REIT structure was also not particularly conducive or 
attractive to hotels since the significant fix costs of hotel operation, high operating 
leverage and high financial leverage meant that profits in the hotel industry are difficult 
to maximize.  In addition, there is always a constant need to return capital into the entity 
to upgrade facilities.  These factors combined with the problem of “leakage” meant that 
prior to the identification of the stapled structure as being applicable to the hotel industry 
REITs were not seen as conducive to the hotel industry.  Table 3 presents a summary of 
the current lodging REITs (December 200), and includes the type of REIT structure, the 
number of properties owned, their trading ticker, the number of guestrooms as well as 














LODGING REITS-DECEMBER 2005 











Equity 33 Hotels AHT 5,095 $ 674. 92 
Boykin Lodging 
Company 
Equity 21 Hotels BOY 5,820 $189.61 
Diamond Rock 
Hospitality Company 
Equity 7 Hotels DRH 2,357 $1,090.68 
Eagle Hospitality 
Properties Corporation 
Equity 12 Hotels EHP 3,243 $175,.77 
Equity Inns, Inc. Equity 123 Hotels ENN 14, 788 $868.36 
FelCor Lodging Trust 
Inc 
Equity 130 Hotels FCH 37, 000 $1,301.91 
Hersha Hospitality Trust Equity 29 Hotels HT 2,981 $191.57 
Highland Hospitality 
Corp. 
Equity 24 Hotels HIH 7, 381 $732.17 
Hospitality Properties 
Trust 
Equity N/A-Invests in 
REITs that 
own hotels. 
HPT N/A $3,093.33 
Host Hotels and Resorts Equity 103 hotels HMT* 54,000 $10,666.29 
Innkeepers USA Trust Equity 70 hotels KPA 8,825 $700.50 
LaSalle Hotel Properties Equity 26 Hotels LHO 8,300 $1,685.91 
MerStar Hospitality 
Corp. 
Equity 73 Hotels MHX 20,319 $921.1 
PMC Commercial Trust Hybrid N/A-Loans & 
commercial 
properties. 
PCC N/A $140.72 
MHI Hospitality 
Corporation 
Equity 6 Hotels MDH N/A $61.68 
Strategic Hotel Capital, 
Inc. 
Equity 16 Hotels SLH N/A $1,618.30 
Sunstone Hotel Investors 
Inc. 
Equity 60 Hotels SHO 17,333 $1,618.65 
Supertel Hospitality Inc. Equity 76 Hotels SPPR N/A $76.25 
Winston Hotels Equity 42 Hotels WXH N/A $295.39  













REIT Performance as Investment Vehicles 
Since their formal introduction as viable investment vehicles in the 1960’s, 
several studies have been conducted relating to how REITs perform as investment 
vehicles.  In fact, as REITs began to grow in prominence as viable investment vehicles, 
the amount of research pertaining to their performance has grown steadily since the latter 
part of the 1970’s, and have consequently enabled investors to better understand how 
REITs perform as investment vehicles under different conditions.   
Generally, studies examining REIT performance are divided into various time 
periods.  First and foremost are those that examined the performance of REITs over the 
short term (periods less than ten years) and those conducted to examine performance over 
the long term (periods of ten or more years), the most comprehensive of which appeared 
in Han & Liang (1995).  Using the traditional Jensen model, Han & Liang, (1995) found 
that REIT performance was similar to the market during the period 1970-1993.  They 
also found however that REIT performance was however not stable over time  Li & 
Wang, (1995) .  They also found however that REIT performance was however not stable 
over time.  However,  Li & Wang, (1995) also in their examination of equity real estate 
investment trusts and mortgage real estate investment trust performance over a twenty 
year period and found that REIT returns were more  predictable than stock returns.  
Still, other researchers have examined the long term qualitative aspects of the 
REIT markets such as appropriateness of REITs for certain investors (Bergsman, 2001; 
Haddock, 1998; Zell, 1998).  Other studies examined REIT performance for shorter 









trusts between the period 1993-1999 and found that real estate investment trusts have a 
high market capitalization.  Still, other researchers have focused on the predictability and 
volatility of REIT returns versus returns from stocks and the inflation hedging ability of 
REITs versus stock investments (Chatrath & Liang, 1998).   
Previous research on real estate investment trusts have also focused on the use of 
several different measures of investment performance.  Several research have focused 
primarily on the factors that affect or influence REIT returns using performance measures 
that are risk adjusted (Goebel & Kim, 1989;Howe & Shilling, 1990).  Other researchers 
have focused on comparing real estate investment trust performance to common stock 
and as well as real estate investments (Kuhle, 1987; Giliberto, 1990; Martin & Cook, 
1991).  Still, others have focused on applying models such as the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) to ascertain the economics factors that affect REIT performance (Chan, 
Hendershott, & Sanders, 1990) while others have focused on the use of models such as 
the Jensen model to ascertain the relative performance of real estate investment trusts.   
Overall, researchers have presented divergent views as it pertains to REIT 
performance especially when compared to the stock market portfolio.  On one hand, 
REITs, most notably equity REITs have been found to outperform the stock market 
portfolio (Kuhle, 1987;Sagalyn, 1990), while other findings suggest contrary viewpoints, 
and in fact have found that compared to the stock market portfolio, REITs have 
performed worse (Titman & Warga, 1986;Goebel & Kim, 1989).   
Han & Liang, (1995) suggested that one plausible explanation for such 









of boom and bust, and several studies on REIT performance only cover relatively short 
time periods.  Additionally, Han & Liang (1995) further noted that in addition to the short 
time period covered by researchers in ascertaining REIT performance, some researchers 
only include survivor REITs in their studies. Sagalyn (1990) suggests that this approach 
of using survivor only REITs to ascertain the relative performance of REITs might be 
flawed since it could potentially be biased.  A further weakness highlighted by Han & 
Liang (1995), in conducting REIT performance related studies is the fact that researchers 
have consistently used the S&P 500 composite index as a benchmark to ascertain the 
relative performance of REITs.  The downside to using the S&P 500 as a benchmark is 
that it contains large capitalization stocks while most REITs are small capitalization 
stocks.  The issue of survivor bias and the choice of performance benchmarks were 
addressed by Han & Liang (1995), who conducted a study to examine the performance of 
REITs over a twenty-three year period.  Using the Jensen Index, an absolute measure of 
performance, which measures performance based upon a more realistic benchmark of a 
portfolio that invests in savings account and the stock market.  Hence, in their study, the 
authors attempted to create an unbiased portfolio that is survivor free.  Overall, they 
found that REITs performed similar to portfolios consisting of three month Treasury bills 
as well as stock market portfolios.  During the examination period, REIT performance 
was found to be unstable.  However, equity REITs, were found to perform better than 
mortgage REITs.  Han & Liang (1995) further concluded that short term performance do 
not effectively predict REIT performance in subsequent periods.  Further, the authors 









overstate overall REIT industry portfolios, especially when compared to the stock market 
portfolio.  This is because, as stated earlier, the S&P 500 excludes small stocks while the 
use of survivor samples  yield performance estimates as compared to an unbiased sample.   
This point was accentuated by Block & French, (2002) who argued that because market 
indices such as the S&P 500 exclude the smaller firms from the indices, they do not 
effectively capture the essence or performance of the market accurately.  Further, market 
indices such as the S&P 500 are value weighted indices.  Block & French(2002) 
proposed that using value weighted indices to measure the performance of publicly traded 
investment vehicles does not yield a complete picture of the investment performance 
since the investment itself my not be value weighted.  Weighted measures of performance 
should be used to account for the effects of both small and large firms on (portfolio) 
performance.  To overcome this weakness, Block & French, (2002) argued that multiple 
index models such as two index models better explain the performance of investments, 
since they clearly identify those that outperform an underperforms the market.  They also 
found that investment performance that is based on using one value based performance 
benchmark measure may not give an accurate picture of the actual performance of the 
investment.  Instead, they argue that two-factor models should be used (Block & French, 
2002).   
 
Lodging REIT Performance 
Despite having the having the highest return (income and long-term returns) 









long term basis, the overall performance of lodging REITs has been one of the best, 
compared to other REIT asset classes (Imperiale, 2002).  However, despite such 
assertions, little research has been conducted to empirically examine the long term 
performance of lodging REITs.  Since their introduction to the public in the 1990s, few 
studies have been conducted to examine the overall performance of lodging REITs.  
Existing lodging REIT performance studies have examined performance from different 
perspectives and have all been short-term (less than a ten year period).  Below is a brief 
overview of the most notable lodging REIT performance studies undertaken to date.  
 In a previous study on the performance of lodging REITs Kim, Mattila, & Gu, 
(2002), examined the performance of lodging REITs between the period 1993-1999 
(short term measure).  In their study (2002), they applied the Jensen Index (Jensen, 1968) 
of performance measure to examine the overall performance of lodging REITs relative to 
the market portfolio, using one way analysis of variance, (ANOVA) and the Tukey 
multiple comparison to examine REIT performance compared to other REIT sectors.  
Their (Kim, Mattila, & Gu, 2002) study findings revealed that overall, lodging REIT 
performance was similar to that of the overall REIT portfolio as well as the market 
portfolio.  However, when compared to other types of REITs, lodging REITs’ 
performance was found to be inferior to that of other types, namely, office, industrial, 
residential and diversified REITs.  Interestingly, the study found that lodging REITs 
performed similar to health care and retail (Kim et al., 2002).  As mentioned, the study 
examined lodging REIT performance over a seven year period.  However, Han & Liang, 









periods could yield inconclusive results since the stock market is susceptible to periods of 
booms and bust.  It is especially important that lodging REIT performance is examined 
for longer periods due to the cyclical nature of the lodging industry as well as its 
sensitivity to events in the macro environment such as economic downturns.   
The study (Kim et al., 2002) also examined the performance of lodging REITs 
against only one benchmark, the NYSE index.  The authors argued that the NYSE index 
was used as a benchmark since thirteen of the nineteen REITs examined in the study 
traded on the NYSE.  Han & Liang (1995) also suggested that multiple benchmarks 
should be used to measure REIT performance so that REIT performance can be examined 
against both small and large companies.   
Other lodging REIT performance studies include Sarheim’s (2006), examined the 
performance of lodging REITs compared to C-Corporations and the S&P 500 during the 
period 2000 to 2005 period.  This was a period during which the U.S. lodging industry 
was affected by several significant events, namely, a weak economy in 2000, the terrorist 
attack in 2001, the SARS epidemic and the Iraq war.  Overall, lodging REITs were found 
to be resilient during this period.  Other related lodging REIT performance studies 
include Kim et al. (2002), who examined the risk features of hotel REITs and Gu & Kim 
(2003), who examined the financial variables that affect hotels REIT’s unsystematic risk.  
 
MEASURING AND BENCHMARKING INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 
 The issue of selecting the appropriate measure of investment performance and 









appropriate benchmark against which to measure return on investment.  Despite advances 
in technology and the application and the invention of advance modeling techniques, the 
debate has continued in investment circles for over three decades.  Friend, Blume, & 
Crockett, (1970) noted that in evaluating performance, caution should be exercised in 
using benchmarks that “fools” the alpha calculation by either overweighing or 
underweighting the returns of small firms.  The importance of benchmark selection, 
investment survivability and the importance of non-CAPM return generating factor when 
measuring performance is also emphasized (Han & Liang, 1995; Admati, Bhattacharya, 
Pfleiderer, & Ross, 1986; Kent, Grinblatt, Titman, & Wermers, 1997;Lehmann & 
Modest, 1987).  Block & French, (2002) noted that since stock indices such as the S&P 
500, which are commonly used as benchmarks against which to measure performance are 
value weighted, their use of evaluating the relative performance of non weighted returns 
may not accurately indicate performance.   
 Other methods traditionally used to evaluate returns include those that are 
classified as risk-adjusted performance measures.  Generally, there are three indices that 
are used to measure the risk adjusted performance of portfolios.  These are, the Treynor 
index (Treynor, 1965), the Jensen index (Jensen, 1968) and the Sharpe index (Sharpe, 
1966).  Of the three, the most common and widely used risk adjusted performance 
measure method for risk-adjusting returns are those that are based on Jensen’s alpha 
(Jensen, 1969), which is generally used to measure whether or not a portfolio over 
performs or underperforms compared to the established stockbroker benchmarks (Han & 









Jensen Index allows for the testing of whether or not the abnormal return of a portfolio is 
statixtifically significant relative to the overall market (Asbere, Kleiman, & McGowan, 
1991).  However, despite the fact that the Jensen’s model has been used to measure 
investment performance, in recent year, the model has been subjected to various 
criticism.  One of the arguments against the use of the model to evaluate performance is 
that the model uses only the market portfolio or one benchmark index (Block & French, 
2002).  Other researchers such as (Fama & French, 1993) argue that a two or three factor 
model would yield a more accurate measure of investment performance. Another 
criticism of the Jensen Index is that it assumes that investors have a diversified portfolio 
and further that the choice of the market index is important in the measuring of a 
portfolio’s performance (Haugen, 2001).   
 However, despite the criticisms of the Jensen Index, it has been has extensively 
used in prior studies to measure the performance of REITs (Goebel & Kim, 1989; 
Cannon & Vogt, 1995; Han & Liang, 1995; Howe & Shilling, 1990 ; Sagalyn, 1990; Kim 
et al., 2002; Block & French, 2002).  The popularity of the Jensen Index compared to the 
other indexes-Sharpe, and Treynor lies in the fact that the Jensen Index permits 
researchers to ascertain whether or not abnormal portfolio returns are statistically 
significant when compared to the overall market (Asbere, Kleiman, & McGowan, 1991).  
For these reasons, the Jensen Index was utilized to measure performance in this research.  











The Sharpe Index (1966) is used to measure investment performance using total 







  jcompanyforIndexSharpetheSI j =  
  Rj   = the nominal return for company j 
  Rf   =  the risk free rate of return 
  σj   =  the standard deviation of returns for company j 
 
Thus, the Sharpe Index  measures reward -to-variability.  The numerator in the equation 
measures the company’s risk premium while the denominator measures the total 
variability of the returns.  Therefore, the higher the index, the greater the risk-adjusted 
return.  In addition, a company’s portfolio will perform better than the market portfolio 
when its Sharpe Index is greater than the market’s ratio (Rm-Rf)/σm] 
 
Treynor Index 
The Treynor (1965) Index measures investment performance using systematic risk.  The 















  TIj  =  the Treynor index for company j 
  Βj  =  the measure of systematic risk for company j 
 
Since the market beta is one, the market’s TI is Rm –Rf .  It follows therefore that a 
company will perform better than the market if its TI is larger than Rm-Rf.   
 
Jensen Index 
The Jensen (1968) Index is an ex-post alpha measure (JI) used to determine the size of 
abnormal returns achieved by a company or its portfolio.  The equation for the Jensen 
Index is as follows: 
The Jensen Index can be seen as follows: 
 
Where  is the return on portfolio i at time t;  is the return on the risk-free 
asset at time t;  is the market return at time t;  is the Jensen Index measure of 
performance on portfolio i;   is the systematic risk for portfolio I; and  is the 
random error with expected value equal to zero (i.e. E( ) = 0). 
 In terms of benchmark measures, the Standard & Poor’s Compoite index has been 
used extensively as a general benchmark for the stock market as a whole as well as a 
benchmark for evaluating the overall performance of investments.  However, the major 
criticism that the S&P 500 has been subjected to as benchmark has been the fact that it 
comprises a sample of 500 major stocks traded on the US stock market.  Hence, the major 









United States, and hence, it may not be accurate in comparing smaller companies to a 
composite of these companies.  On the other hand, if the companies that are being 
compared to the S&P benchmark are similar to the benchmark, then it is appropriate to 
use the S&P 500 as a benchmark (Block & French, 2002).   
 Other studies on REIT performance have focused not on the sector’s performance 
relative to market benchmarks, such as the S&P 500 or the NYSE, but instead have 
focused on the non financial market information to evaluate performance of REIT owned 
properties compared.  For example, Brady & Conlin, (2004), compared the performance 
of REIT owned (hotel) properties to non-REIT properties.  In their study, Brady & 
Conlin, (2002), examined the performance of by using property level information of 
hotels in Texas to ascertain if REITs owned hotel properties performed better than non-
REITs owned properties. The study found that on average, REIT owned hotels performed 
better than non-REIT owned properties based on the four predetermined operational 
criteria. For example, REIT ownership was found to increase REVPAR by nine 
percentage points, and the finding was found to be statistically significant.   The authors 
concluded that the superior performance of REIT own hotels was not attributed to the 
market power of REITs, but instead was based more on the types of amenities and level 
of service offered by the REIT owned hotels.   
 Several researchers have focused on the use of benchmarks used to evaluate 
performance. For example, Han & Liang, (1995) found that the use of the S&P 500 index 
leads to results that overstate performance of REIT portfolios, relative to the stock market 









 In addition, multiple benchmarks should be used to ascertain the relative 
performance of investments.  These include the CRSP equally weighted and the CRSP 
value weighted indices.  These portfolios are deemed to resemble the US stock market 
portfolio closest and are often used as proxies for the market (Han & Liang, 1995).  The   
value weighted CRSP portfolio represents small stocks that trade on the AMEX, 
NASDAQ and  NYSE while the CRSP equally weighted index represents the large 
companies that trade on these same markets.  This is important since several lodging 
REITs have small .market capitalizations ($20-$100 million), and would therefore not be 
included in benchmarks such as the S&P 500 index.   For these reasons, several 
benchmarks were utilized to represent market portfolios in this research to overcome the 
perceived and suggested weaknesses highlighted   
 
THE FUTURE OF REITs 
As discussed in chapter one, the history of REITs as a whole has been marked by 
persistence and resilience.  The general consensus as it pertains to its future as an 
investment vehicle however is that REITs will continue to grow and continue to play a 
great role as investment vehicles (Chan et al., 2003;Mullaney, 1998;NAREIT, 2006). 
However, to remain competitive, REITs must continue to evolve and adjust to the 
changing marketplace.  Hence, REITs must constantly strive to remain competitive and 
continue to offer investors value.  









performance, then it safe to assume that in the future, REITs will continue to display 
resilience and evolve and adjust to changing conditions in the marketplace.  Although 
REIT stock performance over the past four decades has not exceeded those of other 
stocks in the marketplace, there continues to be a strong demand for this investment 
vehicle.  Hence, it follows therefore that as long as demand is strong, REITs as 
investment vehicles will continue to survive.  In addition, the transformation and maturity 
of the of the REIT industry during the 1990s have enabled it to take advantage of 
changing market conditions which will undoubtedly propel its growth as an in vestment 
vehicle.  Prior to the changes which occur during the 1990’s REITs were criticized for 
their fund-like structure and resulting agency costs.  Consequently, few institutional 
investors participated in the REIT market.  However, since the changes in legislations in 
the 1990’s, REITs  have become more operational in nature and display characteristics 
that meet the expectations of institutional investors.  In addition, the fact that REITs have 
become more diverse and dynamic in recent years will ensure that it will continue to be 
an attractive investment vehicle. 
There are several factors that point to, and suggest that REITs will continue to 
grow and evolve as investment vehicles.  First and foremost is the fact that market 
conditions suggest that there is potential for increased securitization and growth of the 
REIT industry in the United States.  In fact, current estimates suggest that REITs account 
for only 10% of the total real estate owned by institutional investors (Chan et al., 2003).  
This suggests that there is potential and room for growth for this investment vehicle 









because of their relatively high dividend payout ratios combined with zero corporate 
income taxes.  Therefore, whenever the stock market is favorable to investors, REITs and 
other stocks will undoubtedly perform well.  However, if the market is perceived as not 
performing favorably or seems to be volatile, as indicated by falling stock prices, 
investors might be reluctant to sell their stocks, and instead will hold them until prices 
rebound.  However, in order for REITs to continue to grow and evolve, REIT managers 
must ensure that in the face of increased attention given to these REITs that they do not 
eventually become overpriced, especially as their yields equal or surpass those of other 
stocks. Thus, overall, while it is always dangerous to attempt to predict the future, there is 














The intent of Chapter three is to present the methodology employed in this 
research.  The research design followed a quantitative approach. The purpose of using a 
quantitative approach is to examine the performance of hotel real estate investment trusts 
and present the evidence as to how lodging REITs performed as investment vehicles.  
The results of this analysis will assist real estate investment trust investors as well as 
lodging asset managers in better understanding the nature and performance of their 
investment. The chapter comprises six distinct sections. Section one focused on the 
statement of problem; section two introduces the research design while section three 
presented the research questions. Section four addressed the data collection and data 
source in general, while section five focused on data analysis and presented the various 
research methods in terms of approaches and their applicability to the research questions. 
Section six focused on data collection and data source while the final section, focuses on 
the validity and reliability of the study.   
 
Problem Statement  
Several studies have been conducted relating to how REITs have performed as 









traditional Jensen model, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), multiple index 
models and two-factor models.  However, to date, little research has been undertaken to 
examine the performance of a key segment of the equity real estate market, lodging or 
hotel REITs.  This is despite the fact that this segment represents a growing and 
significant asset class in the REIT industry.  Lodging REITs have grown significantly in 
terms of numbers, from two at the start of 1993, to a total of nineteen at the end of 2005.  
During the same period, their capitalization grew from $100 million (Gu & Kim, 2003), 
to an estimated equity market capitalization of $17,617,000,000 (National Association of 
Real Estate Investment Trusts, 2006).  This growth has both increased the cash flow into 
the lodging industry while at the same time changed the real estate ownership structure 
within the lodging industry (Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002).  The growth of hotel REITs in 
terms of their absolute numbers as well as their market capitalization suggests that 
knowledge and understanding of the performance of this segment is important, especially 
for investors in making investment and diversification strategy decisions.  Thus, this 
research is an important, necessary and meaningful task since the findings will provide 
information that will assist individual investors, institutional investors, asset managers 
and hospitality executives in effectively managing their hotel real estate portfolios and 
ultimately, maximize their shareholders’ wealth. 
 
Research Design Overview 
 This study is designed to determine whether or not lodging REITs over-perform 









compared to relevant industry benchmarks such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 Market 
Weighted Index (S&P500), the CRSP/NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ (CRSP) value weighted 
and equally weighted indices, and the National Association of Automated Dealers 
Quotation System (NASDAQ) Composite Index.  As discusses previously, these indices 
or market portfolios are commonly used as benchmarks against which to measure 
performance.  As noted previously, generally, there are three indices that are used to 
measure the risk adjusted performance of portfolios.  These are, the Treynor index 
(Treynor, 1965), the Jensen index (Jensen, 1968) and the Sharpe index (Sharpe, 1966).  
Of the three, the most common and widely used performance measure method for risk-
adjusting returns are those that are based on Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1969), which is 
generally used to measure whether or not a portfolio overperforms or underperforms 
compared to established stockbroker benchmarks (Han & Liang, 1995).  
The study is also designed to address the issue of whether lodging REITs over 
perform or underperform other equity REITs.  The other equity REITs include industrial 
REITs, Retail REITs, Residential REITs, Diversified REITs, Health Care REITs, Self 
Storage REITs and Specialty REITs.  This classification is based on the property 
specialization or property sector developed by the National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (NAREIT).  Finally, lodging REITs persistence (or consistency in 
performance) is also a subject of this study.  In this regard, the data were split into two 











This research was designed to answer three research questions. 
Research Question One 
In one study conducted to ascertain the risk and return characteristics of different 
equity REITs, it was found that hotel REITs had higher returns than the benchmark, the 
Standard & Poor’s MidCap 400 index (Chen & Peiser, 1999).  Conversely, hotel REIT 
adjusted risk performance was found to be similar to the performance of the market 
portfolio (Kim, Mattila, & Gu, 2002).  Chen & Peiser (1999) found that REITs 
underperformed stocks on a nominal return basis and performed no better than stocks on 
a risk-adjusted basis.  Similar findings were reported by Sanders (1998), who compared 
the risk adjusted return performance of equity REITs against several benchmarks which 
included the S&P 500 index and the Wilshire index during the 1978 to 1996 period and 
found that during the study period, equity REITs performed no better than the stock 
market indices as it pertained to their risk adjusted excess returns.  Additionally, Chan et 
al., (2003) analyzed several studies relating to REIT performance and noted that over the 
long run, REIT portfolios have not outperformed the stock market.  Similar findings were 
reported by Smith, (1980), who compared the performance of equity REITs with that of 
common stocks and found that during the sample period, equity REITs performed 










Question 1: Do lodging REITs over-perform or under-perform relevant market 
benchmarks? 
Research Question Two 
Hotel REIT returns represent the most volatile of all equity REIT sectors 
(Imperiale, 2002).  In a study of the performance of the hotel REIT sector, compared to 
other equity REITs, hotel REITs were found to display inferior performance (Kim, Gu, & 
Mattila, 2002).   
Question 2: Do lodging REITs over-perform or under-perform other equity 
REITS? 
Research Question three 
It has been noted that the price and performance of REITs are tied to the 
performance of the REITs primary source of income.  Since the demand for lodging is 
intricately tied to and is affected by fluctuations in the economy, the overall demand for 
lodging over the long-term is not stable.  Hence the performance of lodging REITs, 
which are intricately tied to the demand for guest-room, may not be consistent from one 
period to the next.  Further, Han & Liang, (1995) found that although REIT performance 
was similar to the market during the period 1970-1993, their overall performance was 
however not stable over time (Li & Wang, 1995).  In addition, Jegadeesh, (1990) found 
that returns are generally not consistent from one period to another.  Thus, performance 









Question 3: Is the performance of lodging REITs persistent? 
 
Data Collection and Data Source 
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the performance of lodging real 
estate investment trusts, this study utilized time series data obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.  Specifically, the study analyzed the 
monthly REIT stock returns for the period January 1993 to December 2005.  
 The Center for Research in Security Prices has provided comprehensive historical 
stock US market data since 1962.  Their data files include common stocks on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the Standards 
and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ) and CRSP value weighted and CRSP equally weighted indices.    
The CRSP stock files  indices are provided in four frequencies: daily, monthly, quarterly, 
and annually.  The monthly data were utilized for this study.   
 The sample comprised  297 equity REITs that traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the Standard and Poor’s 500 
(S&P 500) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ) during the period January1993 through December 2005.  The returns were 
adjusted for stock splits and dividends.  Initially, a total of 403 REITs were extracted 
from the database which included REITs that were currently being traded as well as those 
that had exited the market.  REITs that traded for less than twelve months and those with 
missing or incomplete data were removed from the sample which resulted in 380 total 









considered for this study.   
 The remaining equity REITs were then classified according to their investment 
sector (equity, mortgage, or hybrid) using constituent data obtained from the National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT).  They were further classified 
into their respective property sectors (diversified, health care, self storage, industrial, 
office, residential, retail, lodging, specialty, or mixed).  REITs were classified according 
to their last trading investment and property sectors as reported by NAREIT.  This 
classification was based on the 75% classification rule which classifies a company 
according to the percentage of assets invested in a specific sub-sector.  According to this 
rule, if 75% or more of a company’s assets are invested in a specific sector, the company 
is classified as being in that sector.  This classification resulted in a total of 299 equity 
REITs, of which 28 were classified as diversified, 16 were health care, 26 were industrial, 
28 were lodging, 5 were classified as mixed, 36 were classified as office, 57 were 
residential, 70 were retail, 22 were self storage,  and 11 were specialty.  It should be 
noted that during the study period, two lodging REITs were classified as hybrids and thus 
were excluded from the study, leaving a total of 297 REITs, of which 26 were lodging.  
Table 4 presents a summary of the twenty-six REITs, their trading ticker and their last 













LODGING REITS AND THEIR LAST REPORTED MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION 
REIT Name Ticker Last reported Market Capitalization 
$m 
Ashford Hospitality Trust AHT 459,787 
Banyan Hotel Investment Fund VHT 3,549 
Boykin Lodging Company BOY 214,999 
Host Funding HFD 512 
Eagle Hospitality Properties Corporation EHP 132,487 
Equity Inns, Inc. ENN 731,714 
FelCor Lodging Trust Inc FCH 1,035,715 
Hersha Hospitality Trust HT 12,250 
Highland Hospitality Corp. HIH 570,081 
Host Marriott Corp New HMT 6,698,048 
Starwood Hotel & Resorts HOT 14,000 
Jameson Inn Inc JAMS 28,031 
RFS Hotel Investors Inc RFS 363,686 
Innkeepers USA Trust KPA 687 
La Quinta Corporation LQI 2,258,468 
LaSalle Hotel Properties LHO 1,197,219 
MeriStar Hospitality Corp. MHX 822,434 
Innsuites  Hospitality Trust IHT 11,796.3 
Strategic Hotel Capital SLH 903,009 
MHI Hospitality Corporation MDH 59,680 
Strategic Hotel Capital, Inc. SLH 1,618 
Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc.N SHO 1,272,490 
Sunstone Hotel Investors INC SSI 362,820 
Wyndham Intl Inc. WBR 873,918 
Supertel Hospitality Inc. SPPR 57,666 
Winston Hotels WXH 262,439 
Source: National Association of Real Estate Investment trusts, December 2005 
 
 To estimate the overall return of each REIT sector the monthly return of each 
sector was first derived as the equally weighted price change plus equally weighted 
dividend yield of the REIT in the sector. 









perform or under-perform relevant benchmarks, the appropriate benchmarks had to be 
chosen.  The benchmarks selected for this study were the Standard & Poor’s 500 Market 
Weighted Index (S&P500), the CRSP equally weighted index, the CRSP value weighted 
Index, and the National Association of Automated Dealers Quotation System (NASDAQ) 
Composite Index.  These four indices were chosen since they are commonly used as 
benchmarks against which to measure performance (Kim et al., 2002;Oppenheimer & 
Grissom, 1998; Han & Liang, 1995).  The benchmark data were also obtained from the 
CRSP database.  It was also decided to use the monthly return on the three-month US 
Treasury Bill (90 days Treasury)  as a proxy for the risk-free rate for this study.  Several 
other studies (Kim et al., 2002;Oppenheimer & Grissom, 1998; Han & Liang, 1995) 
relating to the performance of REITs have used the three month US Treasury Bill as a 
proxy for the risk free rate.  The risk free data were obtained from the United States 
Federal Reserve website ( http://www.federalreserve.gov/).   
 
Data Analysis 
There are three common indices used for measuring risk-adjusted performance of 
stock portfolios: they are the Sharp Index (Sharp, 1966), the Treynor Index (Treynor, 
1965), and the Jensen Index (Jensen, 1968).  All three of these indices generally assume 
that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) theory holds.  This theory generally states 
that a portfolio’s expected price is comprised of the risk-free rate plus the systematic risk 
multiplied by the market risk premium, which is the expected market return less the risk 









and the individual portfolio’s return divided by the variance of the market return.  The 
Sharp Index and the Treynor Index are both based on the ratio of return to risk.  The 
Jensen Index however attempts to measure the relative performance based on the Security 
Market Line (SML).  Of the three, the most commonly and widely used risk adjusted 
performance measure are those based on Jensen’s alpha, which is generally used to 
measure whether or not a portfolio over-performs or under-performs compared to an 
established benchmark.   Mathematically, the Jensen Index can be seen as: 
 
Where  is the return on portfolio i at time t;  is the return on the risk-free 
asset at time t;  is the market return at time t;  is the Jensen Index measure of 
performance on portfolio i;   is the systematic risk for portfolio i; and  is the random 
error with expected value equal to zero (i.e. E( ) = 0). 
The risk-free rate is essentially the return that an investor would expect to receive 
assuming that there was no risk involved in receiving it.  In other words, the return was 
not subject to default risk, yield curve risk, inflation risk, along with various other risks 
affecting securities.  As previously noted, for this study, it was decided to use the 
monthly return on the three-month US Treasury Bill as a proxy for the risk-free rate.   
The  and  in the Jensen Index were estimated using the Least-Squares 
Regression procedure.  This statistical method plots a line through the data that 
minimizes the sum of the squared errors.  For the regression, the market excess return 
was the independent variable and the REIT portfolio less the risk-free rate was the 









REIT and  was  the estimate for the systematic risk on the REIT.  To determine 
whether or not a given REIT portfolio over-performed or under-performed as compared 
with an established benchmark (or market portfolio), we simply need to determine if is 
statistically different from zero.  To determine if the REIT portfolio contributed more or 
less risk than the market portfolio we need to determine if  is statistically different 
from 1. 
In order to perform the detailed calculations used in the study several software 
programs were utilized.  The raw data that were initially extracted from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database were downloaded into Microsoft Excel.  
The data were then sorted through using the filter function and then categorized with the 
use of Excel pivot tables.  Individual REITs were then equally weighted to represent a 
composite for each property sector.  All statistics for the first and second research 
questions were performed using Microsoft Excel 2007, with the exception of the Dubin 
Watson test statistics which were calculated using SPSS Version 14.  The model used to 
answer research question three was also performed using SPSS Version 14, as were the 
model diagnostic tests that were performed. 
Validity and Reliability 
 There are two very useful concepts from statistical measurement theory that are 
relevant here: validity and reliability -which basically correspond to consistency and 
accuracy, (Miller & Miller, 1986; Kirk, 1986).  In this regard, content validity is 









covered by the test items should be representative to the larger domain of knowledge and 
skills, (Messick, 1998).  Content validity was established by examining the “face 
validity” of each variable and reviewing the theoretical models and methods used to 
develop the variables. 
In this regard, content validity was established by the researcher who reviewed 
the theoretical models and methods used to explore the performance of REITs.  This 
review included an examination of a series of literature including the history and 
evolution of REITs, the appeal of REITs as investment vehicles, and REITs performance 
as investment vehicles.  A review of the common measures of-the Jensen Index, Sharpe 
Index and the Treynor index was also conducted.  Based on this review and analysis, it 
was determined that the Jensen index is appropriate for this study.    
Content validity was established since the data used for this research were 
obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) has been the leading provider of historical 
research-quality stock market data to nearly 500 institutions.  CRSP maintains some of 
the largest, and most comprehensive proprietary historical databases in the industry. 
Academic researchers and investment professionals rely on CRSP for accurate, survivor-
bias-free information which provides a foundation for their research and analyses.  The 
statistical tests performed in this study have proven reliability and robustness.  For 
example, tests were perform to detect serial correlations.   
Summary 









used in this research study. Hence, the problem statement, research design, and research 
questions were presented.  The data collection, data source and data analysis methods 
















This chapter presents the empirical findings for this study and provides an analysis 
of the results. The chapter focuses on providing the analysis and results for the three  
research questions that were developed.  The analysis and results focused on each 
specific research question.   
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Research Question One  
To answer this question, a series of non-risk adjusted descriptive statistics were 
performed.  Table V provides a summary of those results.  Here we see that lodging 
REITs have an average monthly return during the period of 0.89%, which is only slightly 
higher than the 0.81% return that the equity REIT market had overall.  However, its 
standard deviation at 6.38% is twice that of the equity REIT market portfolio at 3.12%, 
which would indicate that the lodging REITs are riskier or more volatile than other equity 
REITS overall.  As expected the 90-day treasuries, the proxy for the risk-free rate, had by 









well at 0.32%.  This indicated that they were less risky, but have consistent, albeit lower 
returns. 
TABLE V 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF MONTHLY 
RATE OF RETURN JANUARY 1993 - DECEMBER 2005 
Sector Mean STD Minimum Maximum 
Lodging REIT 0.89% 6.38% -26.41% 26.27% 
Diversified REIT 0.85% 3.33% -10.81% 14.03% 
Health Care REIT 0.63% 4.60% -17.14% 16.16% 
Industrial REIT 1.28% 4.53% -15.08% 20.39% 
Mixed REIT 0.91% 5.37% -20.06% 18.42% 
Office REIT 1.08% 4.18% -14.22% 17.28% 
Residential REIT 0.93% 3.82% -7.06% 31.36% 
Retail REIT 0.59% 3.38% -15.09% 9.31% 
Self Storage REIT 1.00% 3.94% -16.60% 12.10% 
Specialty REIT 0.10% 4.94% -14.26% 15.75% 
Equity REIT Portfolio 0.81% 3.12% -12.39% 9.22% 
S&P 500 Index 0.76% 4.11% -14.58% 9.67% 
CRSP Equally Weighted 
Index 1.32% 5.33% -19.64% 22.50% 
CRSP Value Weighted 0.93% 4.25% -15.77% 8.39% 
NASDAQ 1.05% 7.51% -22.90% 21.98% 
90-day Treasuries 0.32% 0.14% 0.07% 0.53% 
   *REIT portfolio contains all 10 sectors consisting of 297 REITs used in this study 
  
However, while the non risk-adjusted returns provide interesting information regarding 
the risk / return relationship, risks-adjusted analysis provides vastly greater insight into 
the overall structure of the various “real” returns.  Table VI below shows the Jensen 
Index for each REIT sector which was estimated using least squares regression.   
 As stated previously, the α’s and β’s were estimated using the least squares linear 









In order to determine if an individual sector REIT, or the REITs sector as a whole, had an 
excess return (either positive or negative) the α’s were tested to determine if their values 
were statistically different from zero.   
 
TABLE VI 
PERFORMANCE OF REIT SECTOR RELATIVE TO THE S&P500 USING JENSEN 
INDEX  
JANUARY 1993-DECEMBER 2005 
(Ri - Rf )= α + β * (Rm - Rf)  + ε 
(1)   *, **, *** indicates significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
(2) REIT Portfolio contains all ten sectors consisting of the 297 REITS included in the study. 
(3) F-Value’s are all significant at the 0.001 level. 
 
A statistically significant value different from zero implies that the particular 
REIT sector either over-performed or under-performed the particular market portfolio 
Dependent 
Variable Α (coeff) Α (t-stat) Β (coeff) β (t-stat) R2 F- Value 
Dubin 
Watson 
Lodging REIT 0.0033 0.679126 0.5414 -3.8938*** 0.1207 21.1309      1.923  
Diversified REIT 0.0045 1.705761* 0.1953 
-
12.6429*** 0.0576 9.4195      1.980  
Health Care 
REIT 0.0021 0.574815 0.2318 -8.6499*** 0.0423 6.8098      1.985  
Industrial REIT 0.0086 2.401099** 0.2137 -8.9902*** 0.0373 5.9724      2.258  
Mixed REIT 0.0050 1.160329 0.2010 -7.6691*** 0.0236 3.7209      2.461  
Office REIT 0.0065 1.988662** 0.2454 -9.4522*** 0.0578 9.4452      2.236  
Residential REIT 0.0052 1.723269* 0.2045 
-
10.8387*** 0.0480 7.7589      2.193  
Retail REIT 0.0018 0.668687 0.2051 
-
12.2256*** 0.0607 9.9519      2.154  
Self Storage 
REIT 0.0060 1.912137** 0.1891 
-
10.6449*** 0.0385 6.1646      2.155  
Specialty REIT -0.0037 -0.97385 0.3430 -7.0465*** 0.0808 13.5368      2.459  
REIT Portfolio 0.0038 1.590234 0.2503 
-









used (in this case the S&P 500).  An α that was statistically significant and positive 
implied that the REIT over-performed the market portfolio and an α statistically 
significant and negative implied that the REIT under-performed the market portfolio. 
Even though all of the REIT sectors have α coefficients greater than zero (except 
Specialty REITs which were not statistically different than zero when testing) which may 
initially imply that they over-performed the market portfolio, upon closer examination we 
see that only Industrial, Office and Self Storage REITs have α’s that are significant at the  
at the 0.05 level.  This means that Lodging, Diversified, Health Care, Mixed,  
Residential, Retail, and Specialty REITs all performed similar to the market portfolio on 
a risk-adjusted basis.   
The β’s tell us whether the particular REIT sector is riskier or less risky than the 
market portfolio.  The β’s were tested to see if they were statistically significantly 
different than a value of one.  A β of one would imply that the particular REIT sector had 
a risk level approximately the same as the market portfolio; a β greater than one would 
imply that the REIT sector was riskier than the market portfolio; and a β less than one 
implies a REIT sector that is less risky than the market portfolio.  Table VI shows that all 
of the REIT sectors have β’s that are significant at least the 0.01 level.  This would imply 
that all of the REIT sectors are statistically less risky than the market portfolio.  While 
there was no evidence to suggest that the lodging REIT sector over-performed the market 
portfolio, there was evidence that other sectors did so.  Both Diversified and Residential 
were statistically significant at the 0.01 levels and Industrial, Office and Self Storage at 









performed any better on a risk adjusted basis than did the market portfolio. 
Before moving deeper into the results it is necessary to first look at some basic 
model diagnostics.  The first examination is for serial correlation which might be an issue 
given the time dependent nature of the data.  In this regard, the Dubin Watson test 
statistic was conducted to look for Lag 1 autocorrelation.  Based on the results of this test 
we can see that this was not be a problem for data.  Table VI above shows the Dubin 
Watson test statics for each sector which were calculated using the SPSS statistical 
software. 
The next test was to ascertain if the independent variable were symmetric and 
approximately normally distributed.  The independent variable for this test was the S&P 
500 Index less the risk free rate of return, and the dependent variable in question is the 
lodging REIT sector less the risk free rate.  The S&P 500 Index had only minor 
deviations from normality when tested.  Below are a scatter plot  (figure 1) of both the 
independent and dependent variables together and a frequency histogram (figure 2) of the 
independent variable.  These diagrams show that the data are evenly distributed and 
symmetrical.   
The market portfolio or benchmark in Table VI was estimated using the S&P 500.  
It was also of interest to see how the results would have changed if a different Index was 
used as a proxy to the market portfolio instead.  Hence, it was decided to use the CRSP 
equally Weighted Index, the CRSP Value Weighted Index, and the NASDAQ Index as 
market portfolios in the model to represent benchmarks against which performance could 









using the CRSP equally weighted index, Table VIII presents the CRSP value weighted 




SCATTER PLOT OF S&P 500 INDEX LESS RISK FREE RATE VERSUS 

























FIGURE II  






PERFORMANCE OF REIT SECTOR RELATIVE TO THE CRSP EQUALLY 
WEIGHTED USING JENSEN INDEX JANUARY 1993 - DECEMBER 2005 





















(1) *, **, *** indicates significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
(2) REIT Portfolio contains all ten sectors consisting of the 297 REITS included in the study. 






PERFORMANCE OF REIT SECTOR RELATIVE TO THE CRSP VALUE 
WEIGHTED USING JENSEN INDEX JANUARY 1993 - DECEMBER 2005 
(Ri - Rf )= α + β * (Rm - Rf)  + ε 
Dependent 
Variable α (coeff) α (t-stat) Β (coeff) β (t-stat) R2 F- Value Dubin Watson 
Lodging 
REIT    -0.0004   -0.0902     0.6108     -4.6950*** 
   
0.2607    54.3003       1.929  
Diversified 
REIT     0.0030      1.1930      0.2314   -16.4434*** 
   
0.1373    24.5104       1.990  
Health Care 
REIT     0.0003      0.0784      0.2854   -10.8674*** 
   
0.1090    18.8407       1.991  
Industrial 
REIT     0.0072      2.0189 **     0.2412   -11.5674*** 
   
0.0807    13.5136       2.289  
Mixed REIT     0.0030      0.7106      0.2884     -9.1788*** 
   
0.0825    13.8436       2.515  
Office REIT     0.0048      1.4945      0.2864   -12.1435*** 
   
0.1337    23.7639       2.300  
Residential 
REIT     0.0042      1.3792      0.1961   -14.4750*** 
   
0.0749    12.4724       2.231  
Retail REIT   -0.0000   -0.0136     0.2738   -15.6080*** 
   
0.1836    34.6343       2.191  
Self Storage 
REIT     0.0046      1.4804      0.2283   -13.6052*** 
   
0.0952    16.2077       2.202  
Specialty 
REIT   -0.0064   -1.7684***     0.4180     -8.7376*** 
   
0.2036    39.3752       2.493  
REIT 
Portfolio     0.0020      0.8942      0.2945   -17.1930*** 
   









(1) *, **, *** indicates significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
(2) REIT Portfolio contains all ten sectors consisting of the 297 REITS included in the study. 










PERFORMANCE OF REIT SECTOR RELATIVE TO THE  NASDAQ USING 
JENSEN INDEX JANUARY 1993 - DECEMBER 2005 
(Ri - Rf )= α + β * (Rm - Rf)  + ε 
Dependent 
Variable α (coeff) α (t-stat) Β (coeff) Β (t-stat) R2 F- Value 
Dubin 
Watson 
Lodging REIT     0.0022      0.4664      0.5665  -3.8524***     0.1413    25.3395  1.916 
Diversified REIT     0.0039      1.5168      0.2307  -12.6937***     0.0860    14.4879  1.991 
Health Care 
REIT     0.0017      0.4666      0.2330  -8.9475***     0.0458      7.3900  1.982 
Industrial REIT     0.0082      2.2739**      0.2317  -9.1310***     0.0469      7.5842  2.261 
Mixed REIT     0.0043      1.0027      0.2614  -7.4049***     0.0427      6.8653  2.467 
Office REIT     0.0059      1.8075*      0.2859  -9.3813***     0.0839    14.1129  2.248 
Residential REIT     0.0048      1.5869      0.2173  -11.0876***     0.0579      9.4706  2.190 
Retail REIT     0.0013      0.4863      0.2311  -12.3743***     0.0824    13.8374  2.159 
Self Storage 
REIT     0.0054      1.7474*      0.2290  -10.5888***     0.0604      9.8950  2.167 
Specialty REIT    -0.0047    -1.2457     0.4070  -6.7291***     0.1217    21.3356  2.454 









(1) *, **, *** indicates significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
(2) REIT Portfolio contains all ten sectors consisting of the 297 REITS included in the study. 






 It can be easily seen that the β’s are significantly less than one using the three 
additional estimates for the market portfolio.  In addition, the Industrial REIT sector 
consistently appeared to over-perform the market portfolio using all four different 
estimates.  The Office REIT sector statistically over-performed the S&P 500, CRSP 
Dependent 
Variable α (coeff) α (t-stat) β (coeff) β (t-stat) R2 F- Value 
Dubin 
Watson 
Lodging REIT     0.0039  0.7831     0.2512   -11.4168*** 
   
0.0870    14.6747       1.816  
Diversified 
REIT     0.0047  1.7660*     0.0935   -25.8781*** 
   
0.0443      7.1328       1.894  
Health Care 
REIT     0.0027  0.7291     0.0576   -19.0850*** 
   
0.0088      1.3598       1.963  
Industrial REIT     0.0090  2.4708**     0.0864   -18.9491*** 
   
0.0204      3.2115       2.240  
Mixed REIT     0.0049  1.1578     0.1277   -15.3864*** 
   
0.0319      5.0693       2.438  
Office REIT     0.0069  2.0694**     0.1021   -20.3200*** 
   
0.0335      5.3356       2.180  
Residential 
REIT     0.0057  1.8529*     0.0574   -23.0759*** 
   
0.0126      1.9724       2.156  
Retail REIT     0.0021  0.7715     0.0833   -25.4333*** 
   
0.0336      5.3463       2.119  
Self Storage 
REIT     0.0061  1.9571*     0.0939   -21.6908*** 
   
0.0318      5.0502       2.090  
Specialty REIT    -0.0039 -1.0543     0.2364   -15.3917*** 
   
0.1285    22.6986       2.359  
REIT Portfolio     0.0042  1.6948*     0.1050   -27.3937*** 
   









Value Weighted, CRSP equally weighted and NASDAQ proxies of the market portfolio.  
In summary, there is no reason to believe that the lodging REIT sector over-performed 
the market portfolio.  However, the Industrial REIT sector does appear to do just that, as 
it over-performed using all four of the market portfolio estimates.  In essence, lodging 
REITs don’t do better or worse statistically speaking than the market portfolios.  
Industrial however is a different story, they appear to over-perform the market portfolios. 
 
Research Question Two 
 To answer research question two, all 297 individual REITS were analyzed using 
the same least squares linear regression  method employed above (research question one), 
and the α coefficients were estimated.  These α’s were then separated into their respective 
sectors, and an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed to test the null hypothesis 
that all their population means were equal (Ho: µ1 = µ2 =   µ3 = µ4 = µ5 = µ6 = µ7 = µ8 
= µ9 = µ10) versus the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the sectors mean α is 





TEST OF EQUALITY OF JENSEN ALPHAS FOR REIT SECTORS USING ANOVA 
 









Between Groups             0.0068  9                0.0008                  3.8720  
Within Groups             0.0560  287                0.0002   
     
Total             0.0628  296     
(1) F-Value is significant at the 0.001 level. 
 
 The results from the one-way analysis of variance show that we can reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.01 level, thus, concluding that at least one of the REIT sector’s have a 
different mean Jensen α.  However, we still don’t know which population mean or means 
are different than the rest.  Thus, in order to determine if lodging REITs have a different 
mean population Jensen alpha a Tukey test comparison was conducted on the data.  In 
this type of comparison each REIT sectors’ mean is compared to the lodging sector’s 
mean to determine if a statistically significant difference exists.  Table XI below shows 






CALCULATION OF TEST STATISTICS IN JENSEN ALPHA USING TUKEY 
METHOD 
JANUARY 1999 - DECEMBER 2005 









µ2 - µ1             0.0055                          0.1881  
µ3 - µ1             0.0056                          0.2789  
µ4 - µ1             0.0130                          0.0189  
µ5 - µ1             0.0166                          0.1538  
µ6 - µ1             0.0028                          0.4945  
µ7 - µ1             0.0023                          0.5645  
µ8 - µ1          -0.0002                         0.9616  
µ9 - µ1             0.0089                          0.0351  
µ10 - µ1          -0.0079                         0.4658  
 µ1 = mean Jensen alpha for Lodging REITs. 
 µ2 = mean Jensen alpha for Diversified REITs. 
 µ3 = mean Jensen alpha for Health Care REITs. 
 µ4 = mean Jensen alpha for Industrial REITs.  
 µ5 = mean Jensen alpha for Mixed REITs. 
 µ6 = mean Jensen alpha for Office REITs. 
 µ7 = mean Jensen alpha for Residential REITs. 
 µ8 = mean Jensen alpha for Retail REITs. 
 µ9 = mean Jensen alpha for Self Storage REITs. 
 µ10 = mean Jensen alpha for Specialty REITs. 
 
 Since the value was calculated as the various REIT sectors minus the lodging 
REIT sector we can see that lodging REITs have a lower Jensen alpha on average than all 
other sectors except the Retail and Specialty sectors.  The difference is significant at 0.05 
levels for the Industrial and Self Storage REIT sectors.  Thus, there is no evidence to 
suggest that lodging REITs over-performed the other REIT sectors.  The reverse is 
actually the case when compared to the Industrial and Self Storage sectors.   Effectively, 
the results indicated that lodging REITs performed better than some sectors and worse 










Research Question Three 
 To answer research question three, the data were divided into two sample periods 
to see if there was a substantial difference in the Jensen alphas or betas between them. A 
similar analysis was conducted (Kim et al., 2002) using data from the period January 
1993 to December 1999, so it was decided to use this time frame as the first period.  The 
period from January 2000 to December 2005 therefore represented the second period.  
The following model was used to determine if there is indeed a difference between the 
two periods: 
 
Where  is the return on portfolio i at time t;  is the return on the risk-free 
asset at time t;  is the market return at time t;  is the Jensen Index measure of 
performance on portfolio i during the first period;   is the systematic risk for portfolio 
i during the first period;  is a dummy variable that takes the value one for the first 
period and zero for the second period;   is the Jensen Index measure of performance 
on portfolio i during the second period;   is the systematic risk for portfolio i during 
the second period; and  is the random error with expected value equal to zero. 
The use of dummy variables (for alpha and beta for the first period) allowed for 
the testing of differences across the two periods.  The null hypothesis is that there is not a 
difference in the alphas or betas over the two periods (i.e.  = 0 and  = 0).  Table 











CALCULATION OF DIFFERENCE IN PERIOD PARAMETERS FOR 
LODGING REIT SECTOR 
 
Variable Coeffeficient T-value Significents 
 .007 1.506 .134 
 -.012 -1.765 .080 
 .422 5.149 .000 
 .954 13.442 .000 
 
 Examining the data , we can see that both  and  can be rejected at the 0.10 
and 0.01 levels respectively.  Thus we conclude that both the level of over-performance 
and risk has changed between the two periods for the lodging REIT sector.  Hence, we 
can see that the performance of lodging REITs during both periods is not consistent with 














Investment in real estate investment trusts (REITs) have become REITs have become 
common in today’s marketplace.  As such, it behooves prudent investors and managers of such 
assets to constantly track and monitor the performance of real estate investment trusts.  The 
purpose of this research was to examine the performance of lodging real estate investment trusts 
(lodging REITs)  during the period January 1993 through December 2005.  Specifically, the 
study examined lodging REITs relative to standard industry market portfolios or benchmarks 
(the S&P 500, the CRSP value weighted and CRSP equally weighted index, and the NASDAQ 
composite)  and other equity REITs.  The study also ascertained if the performance of lodging 
REITs was consistent from one period to another.   
The results of the study indicted that overall, the performance of lodging REITs was 
inferior to the market portfolios as well as other REIT sectors as a whole.  This finding is 
consistent with a previous study conducted by  Kim et al., (2002).  There are several plausible 
explanations for these findings.  First and foremost is the fact that the performance of individual 
REITs is intricately linked to the performance of the underlying asset (Brounen et al., 2000).  For 









their travel budgets.  Such was the case during the 1991 to 1992 economic recession 
when occupancy and average rates were depressed.  We can therefore see that in periods of 
economic downturn, hotels room rates and occupancy will be negatively affected, which will 
inadvertently depress the overall value of lodging REITs.  Conversely, when the economy is 
robust, travel increases and consequently demand for lodging, which allows such facilities to 
increase their average daily rates.  Such was the case between 1995 and 1996 when lodging 
REITs benefited from a robust economy.  However, the lodging segment of the REIT industry is 
often considered to be the most susceptible to changing economic conditions and non-recurring 
events.  For example, these are events such as the one that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
which greatly reduced demand for lodging.  Such events also have the net effect of not only 
reducing demand for lodging, but also the overall value of REITs.  On the other hand, market 
composites such as the S&P 500 comprise a diversity of companies from various industries, 
many of which are recession resistant.  Hence, lodging REITs will generally underperform such 
market portfolios.   
The notion that the underlying asset drives the value of the REIT also holds true for the 
other Equity REITs as well.  The results indicated that the Industrial and Self Storage segments 
of the equity REIT consistently over performed the market.  This is because unlike lodging 
REITs, these sectors usually require long-term leases and are therefore less susceptible to 
recessions.   
The performance of lodging REITs against other equity REITs may also be inferior due 
to the fact that lodging REITs emerged as viable investment vehicles in 1993.  On the other 









period of time.  As such, they have gone through more investment and business cycles than 
lodging REITs and consequently would have gained investors’ confidence.  Hence, a fairer 
comparison might entail adjustments for the broader market’s return so as to provide a fairer 
comparison between REITs that were not being traded at the same time (as other equity REITs).  
For example, it may be argued that with only 10 lodging REITs trading in 1995, (one of the 
market’s best years), but 16 trading in 2002 (one of the broader market’s worst year), that the 
lodging segment might be unfairly punished.  In summary, lodging REITs investigated in this 
study did not over perform the broader equity REIT market.   
The issue of lodging REIT performance persistence was also a focus of this study.  In this 
regard, the performance of lodging REITs was not found to be persistent, which means that their 
overall performance was not consistent over time.  The issue of performance persistence is 
important for investors , especially those that make decisions based on the past performance of a 
fund.  However, this  lack of persistence in performance is not unusual (Bauman & Miller, 
1994;Phelps & Detzel, 1997).  This finding has important implications for investors since 
information from the past is often of little value in predicting the future performance.  Instead, it 
behooves prudent investors to pay particular attention to the management of the REITs as well as 
the management of the underlying assets.  They should also pay attention to the performance of 
the economic segment of the industry in which the REIT participates.  In summary, although 
lodging REITs were found not to be persistent, past information on the performance of 
investments is often of little value if used by themselves.  Thus, such information should be used 
in conjunction with information such as the ability of the investment to perform admirably under 









In addition, from a practical perspective, it is also advisable that investors especially 
institutional investors recruit and hire investment managers who have proven track records of 
delivering exceptional returns.  In addition, such manager’s performance should be evaluated in 
relation to relative benchmarks that reflect the overall returns on comparable investments.  It is 
also advisable that investors carefully examine the timing of investment performance.  For 
example, if an investment over performs relevant benchmarks or market portfolios during 
recessions or during periods when the overall market is down, then it should provide some level 
of assurance that it is an investment worth securing.  Conversely, if an investment that performs 
superbly during periods of market upsurge, caution should be exercised before labeling this 
investment as an excellent choice.   
Although the results of this study are constrained by the small sample size, it is hopeful 
that the empirical findings will help prudent investors in better understanding the return 
characteristics and performance of lodging REITs and can be useful to both individual and 
institutional investors who hold, or intend to hold asset portfolios that include lodging REITs.   
In addition, this research highlights the fact that the historical performance of the REITs should 
be used only as a guide towards developing investment strategies since the performance of 
investments varies over time. 
 
Study Limitations And Suggestions For Further Research 
Although this study investigated the performance of lodging REITs, the universe of 
lodging REITs was confined to US lodging REITs.  Future studies could examine and compare 









United Kingdom.  In addition, the study employed only one method-the Jensen Index, to 
measure performance.  Future studies could utilize multiple measures of performance.   
In the final analysis, future research should also be directed to address questions such as: 
Are lodging REITs significantly different from common stocks in risk and return performance to 
warrant inclusion in a portfolio to enhance diversification benefits?  Another interesting study in 
the area of lodging REITs would be to focus on the performance of lodging REITs within each 
segment of the lodging industry.  Future research could also focus on the relationship between 
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APPENDIX A  
 
MONTHLY REIT RETURNS (1993-2005) 
 
 
Date Diversified Health Care Industrial Lodging Mixed Office Residential Retail 
Self 
Storage Specialty Total 
Jan-93 9.75% 3.63% 4.47% 28.05% 11.36% 5.16% 8.17% 4.40% 7.18% 1.79% 5.76% 
Feb-93 9.63% -3.67% 10.34% -9.90% 10.37% 2.13% 7.09% 4.38% 5.30% 0.00% 3.97% 
Mar-93 1.71% 10.11% 1.83% 49.00% 3.80% 12.14% 9.39% 7.40% 6.80% 1.75% 7.87% 
Apr-93 -6.93% -1.53% 9.81% -2.34% -6.88% -4.81% -5.00% -5.75% 0.54% -3.45% -4.30% 
May-93 -2.67% 1.31% -3.21% 23.51% 18.60% -1.82% -3.84% -1.65% 1.12% 0.00% -1.29% 
Jun-93 2.55% 1.42% 1.45% -2.83% -0.94% -1.81% 3.51% 3.41% 2.27% -1.79% 2.56% 
Jul-93 2.12% -0.60% 2.50% 2.14% -1.46% 3.39% 4.06% -0.61% 5.07% 3.64% 1.11% 
Aug-93 3.70% -0.90% 5.00% 3.77% -2.35% 5.84% 2.05% 2.04% 7.27% 0.88% 2.29% 
Sep-93 4.76% 6.36% 9.50% 14.70% -5.76% 0.68% 8.81% 1.81% 6.20% 1.79% 4.81% 
Oct-93 -3.14% -0.05% 7.66% 5.90% 0.99% 4.98% -0.21% -4.24% -1.41% -2.58% -1.66% 
Nov-93 -2.84% -4.10% -9.76% -0.27% 10.36% -5.17% -7.44% -5.41% -1.75% -9.73% -5.37% 
Dec-93 -2.35% -0.26% -1.37% 2.57% -17.56% -1.20% 3.00% -0.85% -2.72% 20.57% 0.23% 
Jan-94 2.93% 4.89% 2.08% -0.93% 13.50% 3.09% 0.85% 3.14% 5.89% -8.63% 2.68% 
Feb-94 0.71% 3.51% 4.87% 8.91% 1.96% 4.09% 6.37% 4.38% -2.76% 0.51% 4.19% 
Mar-94 -3.02% -2.66% -0.09% -1.14% -7.29% -4.52% -5.40% -3.83% -3.96% -3.67% -3.91% 
Apr-94 -1.25% 1.37% 5.00% -3.24% -1.96% 3.03% 2.93% -0.24% 2.50% 0.62% 1.22% 
May-94 2.38% 0.45% 3.19% 5.33% 1.02% 1.64% 2.20% 1.55% 4.20% 6.03% 1.93% 
Jun-94 -1.55% -0.81% 0.98% 3.93% -0.47% -2.05% -5.32% -1.11% -1.51% 1.14% -1.97% 
Jul-94 0.44% -0.94% 1.18% -3.09% -1.91% 2.20% -0.62% -1.72% 1.27% 2.25% -0.67% 
Aug-94 1.41% 2.55% -2.45% -2.34% 1.07% 1.77% -0.64% -0.16% 0.04% -1.10% 0.03% 
Sep-94 -2.06% 2.44% -4.75% -3.17% 0.65% -4.87% -1.51% -2.63% 1.16% -5.44% -1.88% 
Oct-94 -4.34% -4.30% -1.75% -3.70% -3.70% -2.08% -4.66% -4.06% -4.25% -1.42% -3.97% 
Nov-94 -2.06% -6.32% -1.70% -8.57% -5.27% -5.29% -3.92% -3.47% -2.51% -8.78% -3.82% 
Dec-94 5.57% 5.22% 9.92% 4.25% 9.18% 2.82% 10.58% 5.84% 3.96% 21.04% 7.19% 
Jan-95 -0.89% 1.86% -4.19% -3.90% 0.78% -1.26% -5.25% -2.58% 1.74% -6.47% -2.58% 
Feb-95 2.05% 3.03% 2.56% 5.36% 2.87% 3.63% 0.18% 2.64% 3.48% 3.14% 2.15% 
Mar-95 0.54% 1.63% -1.52% 3.17% -3.98% 2.06% -0.88% -1.52% 6.56% -6.96% -0.28% 
Apr-95 -1.34% -2.95% -2.47% 2.54% -3.31% 0.71% 0.08% -1.35% -1.62% -1.45% -1.04% 
May-95 2.54% 3.67% 3.17% 0.98% 3.85% 5.06% 3.84% 4.12% -0.22% 10.51% 3.65% 
Jun-95 2.63% 1.03% 3.63% 1.76% 1.08% 1.76% 0.41% 1.55% 1.18% -2.76% 1.41% 
Jul-95 0.62% 1.78% -0.71% 2.94% 1.40% 1.61% 1.43% 0.86% 2.88% -1.71% 1.18% 










Sep-95 0.90% 4.75% 2.67% 5.64% 5.04% 3.87% 1.32% 0.31% 2.14% -0.04% 1.84% 
Oct-95 -1.23% -5.06% -0.19% -2.17% -3.28% 2.07% -3.42% -5.19% -0.94% -0.93% -3.15% 
Nov-95 2.31% 3.45% -0.89% -0.10% -3.32% 0.47% 2.55% -0.82% 0.73% 2.29% 0.93% 
Dec-95 4.54% 5.74% 6.79% 2.50% 5.63% 5.74% 5.76% 4.79% 5.44% 3.24% 5.26% 
Jan-96 0.20% 9.67% 3.57% 7.76% 6.20% 3.74% 1.65% -1.26% 2.22% 2.09% 2.34% 
Feb-96 -0.34% -1.37% 0.00% 2.59% -1.18% 1.07% 2.12% -0.02% 0.97% 8.29% 0.62% 
Mar-96 -0.30% -4.11% -2.45% -1.55% -5.10% -0.10% -1.30% 0.59% 0.71% -0.16% -0.91% 
Apr-96 0.51% -2.23% -0.36% -2.58% 0.37% 2.32% -0.60% -0.13% -0.98% -2.73% -0.43% 
May-96 1.59% -0.16% 1.29% 4.86% -1.19% 1.69% 0.75% 3.00% 0.66% -0.59% 1.69% 
Jun-96 2.97% -1.01% 0.87% -0.99% -2.30% 0.38% 0.87% 2.14% -0.98% -0.98% 0.88% 
Jul-96 1.41% -3.18% 1.30% -2.95% 0.21% 0.54% -0.40% -0.35% 1.05% 6.36% -0.33% 
Aug-96 4.02% 6.54% 3.95% 5.72% 7.30% 4.80% 2.22% 3.27% 2.71% 4.79% 3.79% 
Sep-96 0.78% 0.99% 1.82% 5.42% 1.62% 2.15% 1.36% 0.86% 3.28% 2.64% 1.68% 
Oct-96 2.83% -0.71% 1.23% 2.74% -0.26% 0.37% 3.52% 1.37% 2.36% 3.99% 1.84% 
Nov-96 5.12% 3.90% 4.92% 5.41% 6.88% 4.84% 2.63% 3.85% 7.63% -2.48% 4.21% 
Dec-96 15.79% 2.61% 10.43% 11.38% 9.96% 11.97% 8.26% 9.42% 14.01% 11.56% 9.93% 
Jan-97 2.09% -1.32% 1.18% 5.41% 0.66% 0.98% 1.27% -1.00% -3.65% -3.41% 0.46% 
Feb-97 -0.18% 4.11% 1.07% -2.28% -7.17% 1.21% -0.51% -0.63% -4.41% 7.32% -0.18% 
Mar-97 4.73% 1.66% -1.20% 1.70% 2.62% -1.26% -0.89% -1.33% 3.62% -4.50% 0.08% 
Apr-97 -2.81% 2.17% -4.73% -2.41% -1.54% -5.36% -3.02% -2.03% -4.65% 0.92% -2.78% 
May-97 3.91% 1.52% 1.52% 0.65% 0.06% 1.24% 3.68% 2.65% 1.18% 5.47% 2.36% 
Jun-97 9.15% 3.18% 4.10% 7.75% 3.77% 4.33% 2.96% 4.30% 5.66% 5.89% 4.66% 
Jul-97 -1.70% 0.91% 5.02% 2.64% 5.88% 4.98% 1.86% 2.17% 2.66% -6.27% 2.41% 
Aug-97 0.44% -0.83% -2.54% 0.31% -1.64% 0.96% -1.23% -1.20% -3.56% 4.09% -0.67% 
Sep-97 18.66% 3.85% 8.86% 17.17% 5.28% 12.01% 7.45% 3.89% 4.14% 8.99% 9.01% 
Oct-97 -2.63% -11.21% -0.38% 0.21% 3.94% -4.80% -4.27% -2.67% -6.10% -5.76% -3.65% 
Nov-97 2.07% -0.23% 2.48% -4.96% -0.16% 3.07% 2.68% 1.57% 0.55% 1.75% 1.49% 
Dec-97 3.07% 3.54% 3.83% -0.76% 1.78% 2.23% 0.48% 2.00% 5.34% 14.74% 2.11% 
Jan-98 -5.28% 1.23% -0.61% -4.79% -4.45% -1.63% -1.12% 0.80% 5.75% -6.46% -1.12% 
Feb-98 -3.65% 2.52% -2.60% -0.97% -1.55% -3.18% -2.54% -0.50% -3.82% 5.15% -1.79% 
Mar-98 4.19% 0.03% 2.90% -1.31% 0.98% 2.41% 2.52% 1.60% -0.51% 1.14% 1.64% 
Apr-98 -5.51% -4.88% -4.63% -5.20% -4.45% -4.44% -2.40% -2.20% -0.95% -8.58% -3.73% 
May-98 -0.51% 0.45% -0.55% -5.49% 4.53% -1.97% 0.74% -0.33% -1.55% -6.38% -1.24% 
Jun-98 0.07% -2.81% 0.93% -0.23% -3.76% -0.93% -1.76% 0.42% -5.21% -1.28% -0.74% 
Jul-98 -9.16% -5.57% -5.65% -15.22% -2.05% -7.82% -4.22% -4.68% -5.18% -11.71% -7.17% 
Aug-98 -13.28% -9.75% -8.40% -18.28% -9.44% -9.26% -7.42% -6.55% -10.42% -12.56% -9.79% 
Sep-98 6.50% 9.96% 10.71% -0.79% 4.97% 5.45% 6.05% 6.06% 13.08% 8.03% 6.07% 
Oct-98 1.61% -3.72% -3.13% -7.01% -4.05% -2.53% -2.51% -0.42% -1.80% 11.33% -2.18% 
Nov-98 4.63% -1.21% -0.85% 1.65% 6.86% 3.02% 0.05% 0.18% 0.08% 1.63% 1.16% 
Dec-98 -5.22% -0.67% -0.17% -11.85% 0.16% -1.82% 0.14% -1.53% 1.32% -2.69% -2.23% 










Feb-99 -3.75% -11.93% -2.41% 4.96% -6.78% -0.59% -0.82% -2.81% -1.98% -2.71% -1.48% 
Mar-99 1.11% -3.31% -2.03% -2.34% -4.47% -1.74% 0.08% -1.79% -0.87% -2.85% -1.41% 
Apr-99 8.84% 7.58% 7.61% 18.28% 15.12% 9.98% 9.79% 7.16% 10.74% 11.15% 10.14% 
May-99 1.63% 1.55% 0.61% -4.67% 0.77% 4.00% 2.54% 3.80% 3.92% -12.92% 1.56% 
Jun-99 -2.41% -3.23% 0.70% -4.51% 3.45% -3.34% 0.29% -3.58% -2.82% 2.54% -2.09% 
Jul-99 -1.28% -7.34% -3.68% -9.56% -4.90% -3.86% -4.34% -1.84% -6.58% 11.68% -3.62% 
Aug-99 -3.36% -5.18% -1.33% -9.25% 2.30% -0.49% 1.42% -2.40% -1.27% -5.98% -1.99% 
Sep-99 -5.85% 2.39% -3.58% -5.14% -5.30% -6.51% -3.37% -4.71% -3.10% 2.56% -4.20% 
Oct-99 -4.11% -1.69% -0.88% -0.79% 0.73% -4.19% -1.30% -3.00% -2.70% -9.16% -2.65% 
Nov-99 1.33% -6.15% -2.49% -3.85% -0.16% -2.61% -1.67% -1.48% -5.79% -1.08% -2.17% 
Dec-99 2.01% -8.26% 3.86% -0.44% 7.55% 7.50% 3.43% -1.56% 2.06% 11.34% 2.73% 
Jan-00 -0.01% 2.34% 0.03% 1.75% -6.24% 0.89% -1.89% 3.02% -0.74% -3.46% 0.44% 
Feb-00 -2.42% -7.66% -3.44% -4.52% -1.95% -0.63% -1.10% -3.53% 0.25% 18.05% -1.44% 
Mar-00 3.82% 0.49% 4.09% 7.08% 5.05% 4.48% 2.86% 1.41% -1.20% -3.90% 2.98% 
Apr-00 2.59% 10.39% 5.95% 12.15% 3.39% 5.39% 7.32% 7.23% 3.30% 2.64% 6.65% 
May-00 6.12% -2.20% 2.18% 0.55% 2.25% 1.43% 0.76% -0.27% -1.44% -3.94% 0.81% 
Jun-00 1.09% 0.08% 3.35% 7.83% 5.27% 3.13% 2.78% -0.64% 2.76% 5.91% 2.72% 
Jul-00 9.62% 14.03% 7.19% 8.18% 9.44% 9.66% 10.27% 6.45% 7.48% 1.59% 8.48% 
Aug-00 -3.18% -4.15% -1.23% -4.44% -5.87% -2.97% -4.44% -5.21% -3.85% -16.22% -4.28% 
Sep-00 1.16% 7.46% 2.55% 0.79% 5.10% 5.07% 2.89% 2.46% -1.38% -15.75% 2.45% 
Oct-00 -6.70% -2.56% -5.16% -5.48% -4.66% -4.68% -3.56% -4.12% -5.52% -1.20% -4.46% 
Nov-00 6.56% -7.35% 0.29% 5.28% -0.62% 0.26% 2.54% 1.70% -1.92% -11.33% 1.41% 
Dec-00 3.11% 8.68% 5.22% 8.03% 9.10% 5.66% 7.42% 4.76% 11.04% 7.51% 6.30% 
Jan-01 -1.75% 12.26% -0.65% 9.70% -4.38% -2.61% -3.09% 5.89% 6.16% 11.93% 1.77% 
Feb-01 -0.68% 0.30% -3.65% -5.90% -0.83% -1.79% -1.81% -1.34% -2.41% -5.47% -2.28% 
Mar-01 0.19% 7.92% -0.83% -2.06% 2.39% -2.18% 0.35% 2.12% 4.32% -1.67% 0.21% 
Apr-01 2.91% 5.65% 0.28% 5.04% 2.67% 2.16% 0.87% 2.37% 3.40% 2.24% 2.32% 
May-01 2.68% 0.05% 1.62% 5.77% 0.41% 0.68% 1.74% 3.09% 1.54% 3.64% 2.26% 
Jun-01 2.60% 6.81% 5.67% -0.48% 1.35% 7.14% 4.67% 5.65% 8.02% 8.63% 5.02% 
Jul-01 -1.87% 1.01% -3.21% -3.48% 0.08% -4.42% -0.55% -2.19% -1.51% -5.43% -2.38% 
Aug-01 1.24% 1.38% 2.44% -2.24% 3.27% 4.83% 3.49% 2.87% 9.14% 2.75% 2.91% 
Sep-01 -2.93% 2.84% -4.23% -32.25% -5.21% -1.31% -2.29% -4.60% 1.45% -7.61% -4.79% 
Oct-01 -4.57% 2.04% -1.88% 0.36% -5.78% -7.11% -6.27% 2.17% -0.56% 4.36% -2.77% 
Nov-01 0.24% -0.75% 7.39% 20.59% 6.65% 3.60% 6.42% 4.83% 3.62% 1.12% 5.81% 
Dec-01 3.93% -0.16% 0.00% 6.72% 3.41% 2.12% 0.49% 1.71% -0.09% 0.94% 1.84% 
Jan-02 0.94% 5.31% -0.98% 11.70% -2.25% -1.73% -4.38% 1.38% 6.70% 6.91% 1.02% 
Feb-02 1.82% -0.48% 3.16% 5.32% 2.14% 0.48% 1.56% 1.35% -0.12% 1.71% 1.70% 
Mar-02 5.45% 4.96% 6.02% 7.40% 7.11% 5.59% 6.21% 4.91% 1.18% -1.65% 5.31% 
Apr-02 0.80% 0.74% -0.40% 0.85% -1.23% -1.76% 0.36% 2.65% 2.57% 2.78% 0.65% 
May-02 -0.06% 0.58% 3.94% -5.29% 6.99% 3.01% -1.05% 1.67% -2.57% -0.45% 0.60% 










Jul-02 -5.97% -2.01% -4.18% -13.27% -7.70% 
-
10.24% -5.04% -2.87% 1.19% -6.03% -5.90% 
Aug-02 -2.32% -2.18% -0.06% -2.74% 1.23% 1.71% 0.87% 0.54% -12.95% -6.66% -0.49% 
Sep-02 -3.49% -1.83% -2.87% -10.05% -4.59% -4.88% -8.83% -0.78% -0.68% -8.63% -4.57% 
Oct-02 -5.23% -1.83% -3.95% -2.20% -6.07% -7.12% -6.05% -3.69% -6.80% -0.38% -4.70% 
Nov-02 3.97% 0.81% 2.08% 7.45% 6.20% 4.38% 6.13% 2.95% 4.34% 6.21% 4.29% 
Dec-02 0.59% -6.87% 1.71% -3.44% 1.71% -0.53% -0.81% 1.40% 3.16% -2.55% -0.25% 
Jan-03 -5.51% -3.07% -1.38% -4.65% -6.17% -3.59% -2.87% -1.51% -4.28% -5.75% -3.03% 
Feb-03 0.75% -0.91% 1.59% -8.96% 3.45% 1.25% -0.50% 4.78% 4.51% 0.97% 1.20% 
Mar-03 1.65% -4.17% 2.04% 1.87% -0.12% 2.40% 0.35% 2.76% -4.16% 0.16% 1.38% 
Apr-03 3.06% 10.42% 0.69% 10.12% 0.20% 3.21% 6.18% 3.08% 5.71% 6.59% 4.49% 
May-03 8.17% 7.08% 3.98% 11.69% 6.82% 6.19% 3.17% 4.52% 5.48% 11.00% 5.74% 
Jun-03 2.38% 4.98% 1.05% -1.24% 3.86% 2.10% 0.06% 2.15% -0.78% 0.62% 1.44% 
Jul-03 2.92% 6.12% 1.71% 11.49% 0.66% 2.72% 6.98% 6.37% 6.33% 5.19% 5.42% 
Aug-03 -0.25% -2.28% 0.17% 2.38% 0.66% -0.59% 1.36% 0.58% 0.26% -3.58% 0.27% 
Sep-03 1.37% 5.56% 5.97% 6.05% 5.75% 1.44% 1.03% 2.57% 6.01% -1.46% 2.78% 
Oct-03 4.00% 4.24% -0.84% -0.93% -1.54% 1.88% -0.34% 2.02% 2.11% 3.95% 1.35% 
Nov-03 6.01% 3.83% 4.27% 3.97% 3.75% 3.04% 1.61% 5.41% 8.73% 1.95% 4.05% 
Dec-03 1.12% 6.75% 3.81% 5.16% 2.82% 3.82% 1.40% 1.36% -0.91% 10.63% 2.90% 
Jan-04 2.69% 10.21% 4.96% 2.61% -0.75% 3.64% -0.64% 6.53% 7.14% 1.54% 4.10% 
Feb-04 0.95% 0.20% 0.38% 3.77% 9.10% 0.68% 0.90% 3.02% 0.04% 3.66% 1.82% 
Mar-04 4.81% 4.34% 5.58% 4.01% 6.07% 3.37% 2.62% 7.45% 3.61% 3.84% 4.90% 




17.98% -14.96% -11.47% -13.98% 
May-04 7.56% 3.41% 9.08% 5.33% 8.75% 6.05% 6.72% 6.55% 10.68% 5.67% 6.66% 
Jun-04 3.23% 0.72% 2.03% 5.24% 0.74% 1.66% 2.27% 2.96% 0.08% 4.28% 2.57% 
Jul-04 -0.40% 2.44% 0.42% -0.26% -5.10% -0.10% -0.52% 0.82% 1.66% -3.11% 0.09% 
Aug-04 7.29% 4.47% 7.63% 1.39% 5.04% 7.29% 7.35% 10.18% 7.50% 5.55% 7.40% 
Sep-04 -0.52% 1.42% -1.85% 3.30% -1.31% -1.80% -1.50% -0.03% -2.73% 3.34% -0.34% 
Oct-04 5.34% 5.10% 6.21% 2.97% 1.48% 3.62% 5.78% 6.15% 4.64% 3.83% 5.05% 
Nov-04 6.14% 0.41% 3.85% 7.40% 1.56% 1.75% 4.37% 5.34% 2.84% 4.73% 4.25% 
Dec-04 1.83% 1.93% 2.44% 10.19% 5.31% 5.72% 5.05% 3.73% 4.03% 2.83% 4.62% 
Jan-05 -7.63% -8.27% -9.70% -3.87% -8.33% -7.69% -9.24% -9.01% -5.89% -7.29% -8.00% 
Feb-05 -1.66% 0.06% 3.37% -0.50% 5.92% 4.46% 2.12% 3.69% 2.58% 5.22% 2.68% 
Mar-05 0.02% -4.62% -5.26% 1.56% -5.15% -0.79% -2.06% -3.04% 3.52% -1.43% -1.74% 
Apr-05 6.49% 6.89% 3.43% -2.85% 1.49% 4.90% 5.62% 7.37% 2.81% -0.67% 4.58% 
May-05 3.91% 5.10% 2.97% 3.15% 3.35% 1.23% 2.84% 3.91% 3.55% 4.77% 3.18% 
Jun-05 3.26% 3.02% 3.63% 4.79% 8.07% 4.47% 6.08% 4.59% 4.55% 4.34% 4.62% 
Jul-05 7.54% 4.78% 8.32% 6.04% 1.99% 6.95% 7.67% 7.46% 5.28% 6.13% 6.99% 
Aug-05 -3.38% -3.90% -3.79% -5.43% -2.61% -4.08% -5.63% -4.67% 3.83% -3.61% -4.16% 










Oct-05 -4.83% -5.00% -1.11% -0.72% -0.81% -3.38% 1.20% -4.01% -0.79% -0.96% -2.25% 
Nov-05 3.47% 0.56% 3.49% 6.76% 3.79% 3.86% 3.17% 4.86% 5.59% 2.12% 4.08% 
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